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ABSTRACT—Prerogative is the devolution of power to a single legislator
over decisions in her district. In cities with a prerogative regime, when the
city council votes on an issue or an administrative agency makes a decision
concerning a specific district, decision-makers defer to that district’s
legislator. This deference gives the legislator exclusive executive authority
over her district. In Chicago and Philadelphia, legislators have infamously
wielded prerogative and tied the practice to corruption. But in addition to
corruption, prerogative gives rise to another, more pernicious issue. When
applied to decisions related to affordable housing, prerogative perpetuates
racial segregation through legislator vetoes. Prerogative empowers
legislators to unilaterally block the land use and financing approvals
necessary to develop affordable housing in their districts. As legislators from
wealthy districts block affordable housing through prerogative, affordable
housing remains concentrated in racially isolated communities, thereby
further entrenching existing patterns of housing segregation.
Prerogative’s opponents have proposed legislative reform to curb the
practice, but these proposals do not sufficiently account for political inertia:
legislators are unlikely to curtail their own power. In the absence of
legislative reform, housing advocates should turn to the courts. Judicial
intervention can serve as the catalyst to effectuate land use reform that
constrains prerogative and promotes equitably sited affordable housing.
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INTRODUCTION
Following Chicago’s 2019 municipal election, incoming mayor Lori
Lightfoot marked her first day in office with ambitious executive action:
curbing the influence of “aldermanic privilege.”1 The tradition of aldermanic
privilege, also known as prerogative,2 refers to the power Chicago aldermen
hold over city governmental actions in their respective wards.3 Prerogative
enables aldermen to unilaterally approve or block decisions in their wards—
including permitting, licensing, and zoning—through an unwritten policy of
deference that effectively gives aldermen sole decision-making power.4

1 Chi.,
Ill.,
Executive
Order
No.
2019-2
(May
20,
2019),
https://chicityclerk.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/document_uploads/executive-order/2019/F201993.pdf [https://perma.cc/TR3S-P3YH] (reforming aldermanic prerogative); see also Sara Freund, On Day
One, Lori Lightfoot Takes Away Aldermen’s Ability to Block Development, CURBED CHI. (May 21, 2019,
10:09 AM), https://chicago.curbed.com/2019/5/21/18633475/lori-lightfoot-chicago-mayor-aldermanexecutive-order [https://perma.cc/K7XT-397A].
2 See Chi., Ill., Executive Order No. 2019-2, supra note 1.
3 See generally Christopher Thale, Aldermanic Privilege, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CHI. (2005),
http://www.encyclopedia.chicagohistory.org/pages/2197.html
[https://perma.cc/W83Y-CET8]
(overviewing aldermanic prerogative).
4 See Patrick Sisson, How Aldermanic Privilege Shaped Chicago, CURBED CHI. (May 31, 2019, 1:42
PM),
https://chicago.curbed.com/2019/5/31/18646174/chicago-politics-city-council-corruptionaldermanic-privilege [https://perma.cc/LP5M-CZRH].
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While proponents of the practice argue it fosters local accountability,5 it also
creates opportunities for corruption given its discretionary nature. In the
words of Lightfoot’s Executive Order, prerogative “undermine[s] the
legitimacy of government in the eyes of the public.”6
Lightfoot had campaigned on a pledge to reform prerogative,7 a critical
issue sparked in part by the 2019 federal indictment of the longest-serving
alderman in Chicago history,8 and her Executive Order sought a turning point
in the city’s culture of corruption.9 The Order directed city administrative
agencies to end their deference to aldermanic privilege as soon as
practicable.10 But Mayor Lightfoot could not command the city council itself
to change how its legislators honored an unwritten tradition.11 Thus, city
council decisions over land use policies like zoning remained subject to
aldermanic prerogative.12

5 For example, 35th Ward Alderman Carlos Ramirez-Rosa said, “I do think that there is some
measure of accountability through the aldermanic prerogative system that we have because it demystifies
the zoning process for local residents.” Tanvi Misra, How Chicago’s Aldermen Help Keep It Segregated,
BLOOMBERG CITYLAB (Aug. 2, 2018), https://www.citylab.com/equity/2018/08/how-chicagosaldermen-help-keep-it-segregated/564983/ [https://perma.cc/YR4L-A6R3]; see also Bill Ruthhart, In
Tribune Meeting, Lori Lightfoot and Toni Preckwinkle Clash over Power of Aldermen, City Hall
Corruption, CHI. TRIB. (Mar. 12, 2019, 6:00 PM), https://www.chicagotribune.com/politics/elections/ctmet-chicago-mayors-race-lightfoot-preckwinkle-tribune-editorial-board-20190311-story.html
[https://perma.cc/LW6A-K2KA] (describing a mayoral candidate who argued that prerogative enables
aldermen to better serve their constituents).
6 Chi., Ill., Executive Order No. 2019-2, supra note 1, at 1.
7 See Ruthhart, supra note 5.
8 For an overview of the indictment and Ed Burke’s historical power, see Chicago’s Political System
Is Set Up to Produce Corruption, ECONOMIST (Jan. 12, 2019), https://www.economist.com/unitedstates/2019/01/12/chicagos-political-system-is-set-up-to-produce-corruption [https://perma.cc/D5PHFWYL].
9 As the Chicago Tribune editorial board eloquently described it: “To put it in Chicagoese, Da new
mare don’t like aldermanic privilege.” Editorial Board, Mayor Lightfoot and the Machine . . . Part 2:
Aldermen, Limiting Your Privilege Will Help Fix City Hall, CHI. TRIB. (May 15, 2019, 5:00 PM)
[hereinafter
Editorial
Board,
Mayor
Lightfoot
and
the
Machine],
https://www.chicagotribune.com/opinion/editorials/ct-edit-lightfoot-aldermanic-privilege-prerogativecity-council-20190515-story.html [https://perma.cc/X2X9-ALWK] (describing Lightfoot’s Executive
Order aimed at curtailing aldermanic prerogative).
10 Chi., Ill., Executive Order No. 2019-2, supra note 1, at 2.
11
See Sisson, supra note 4 (noting prerogative is “an unwritten law of Chicago political power, an
unspoken privilege long abused by power brokers”).
12 See Claudia Morell, How Far Should Mayor Lightfoot Go to Curb Chicago Aldermen?, NPR (July
1, 2019), https://www.npr.org/local/309/2019/07/01/737197413/how-far-should-mayor-lightfoot-go-tocurb-chicago-aldermen [https://perma.cc/9ZWT-DKZM].

551

NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

While media coverage of Lightfoot’s Order described prerogative as a
local matter,13 prerogative’s influence reaches much further. Cities across the
country—from San Francisco to Nashville to New York—have grappled
with prerogative’s hold on their respective decision-making processes.14 For
example, like Chicago, Philadelphia’s own tradition of prerogative garnered
significant political attention after federal prosecutors charged one of the
city’s council members with wire fraud for extorting developers in
connection with zoning.15 In Los Angeles, the growing homelessness crisis
turned the spotlight on council members who exercised prerogative to block
affordable housing developments.16 Thus, while Mayor Lightfoot sought to
constrain prerogative’s influence in Chicago, prerogative’s impact stretches
coast to coast.
Despite Lightfoot’s Executive Order, nearly one year later, prerogative
still reigns in Chicago.17 To Lightfoot’s credit, aldermen no longer have total
discretionary control over certain administrative permitting processes such
as those pertaining to bikeshare dock stations and landscaping requests.18
But, especially as it relates to issues of housing development, prerogative’s
grip on Chicago has only tightened: Lightfoot’s aldermanic allies have
advised her that she would lose a city council vote to eliminate prerogative
over zoning.19 Meanwhile, even the progressive, recently elected aldermen
who most vocally support affordable housing have found prerogative’s
unfettered power too alluring to give up, and they have used prerogative to
13
This is an understandable media angle given aldermanic prerogative’s roots in Chicago machine
politics. See Sisson, supra note 4.
14 See infra Section I.C.
15 See infra notes 80–81 and accompanying text.
16 See infra notes 121–126 and accompanying text.
17 See Brianna Kelly, Brendan Reilly on Aldermanic Privilege, Condo Deconversions and
Development in the 42nd Ward, THE REAL DEAL (Dec. 20, 2019, 1:00 PM),
https://therealdeal.com/chicago/2019/12/20/ald-brendan-reilly-on-aldermanic-privilege-condodeconversions-development-in-the-42nd-ward/ [https://perma.cc/3PZN-4722] (interviewing 42nd Ward
Alderman Brendan Reilly on the viability of aldermanic privilege after Lightfoot’s Order). See generally
CITY OF CHI., SIXTY-DAY REPORT ON IMPLEMENTATION OF EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 2019-2 (2019),
https://www.chicago.gov/content/dam/city/depts/mayor/Press%20Room/Press%20Releases/2019/Augu
st/MLEL_SixtyDay_Rprt_FINAL.pdf [https://perma.cc/93PV-TBSR] (detailing the findings and
implementation of Lightfoot’s Executive Order on prerogative).
18 See Morell, supra note 12.
19 Fran Spielman, Lightfoot’s Most Powerful City Council Ally Urges Her to Abandon Threat to
Abolish Aldermanic Prerogative over Zoning, CHI. SUN-TIMES (Jan. 24, 2020, 2:37 PM),
https://chicago.suntimes.com/city-hall/2020/1/24/21080478/aldermanic-prerogative-zoning-lorilightfoot-lose-fight-scott-waguespack [https://perma.cc/35HF-EPNZ]. For a visual of prerogative’s
impact on Chicago’s “splotchy” zoning pattern that “follows no larger logic,” see Emily Badger
(@emilymbadger), TWITTER (June 18, 2019, 7:58 AM), https://twitter.com/emilymbadger/status/
1140967032000847874 [https://perma.cc/8R8N-JZ3B].
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further their own pro-affordable housing agendas.20 Consequently, local
media have begun to spotlight prerogative’s impact on housing, rather than
just focusing on prerogative’s traditional association with corruption.21
This narrative shift is long overdue. The continued segregation of
American cities remains a glaring civil rights issue today.22 This Note argues
that the most pernicious aspect of aldermanic prerogative is its segregative
impact. At its core, prerogative delegates control over development to a
hyperlocal level, giving individual legislators total discretion over the
construction of affordable housing in their districts. This tool of hyperlocal
control, when coupled with constituencies that still mostly oppose affordable
housing development in their midst, results in the consistent vetoing of such
developments.23 These legislator vetoes prove particularly problematic
because affordable housing is critical to communities of color24—a reality
20 See Alby Gallun, Progressive Aldermen Guard Their Privilege, CRAIN’S CHI. BUS. (Dec. 6, 2019,
3:37 PM), https://www.chicagobusiness.com/government/progressive-aldermen-guard-their-privilege
[https://perma.cc/B4F2-7LFH] (describing how Alderman Byron Sigcho-Lopez’s use of prerogative to
demand a greater percentage of affordable units has “create[d] a dilemma for Lightfoot”); Heather
Cherone, Controversial Plan to Turn Closed Humboldt School into Teacher-Focused Apartments Stalls
Again, CHALKBEAT (Nov. 21, 2019, 12:51 PM), https://chalkbeat.org/posts/chicago/2019/11/21/plan-toturn-closed-humboldt-school-into-teacher-focused-apartments-stalls-again/
[https://perma.cc/ASZ8PJLF] (describing how Alderman Daniel La Spata wielded prerogative in November 2019 to block
Chicago’s Plan Commission from voting on a redevelopment proposal because it was not sufficiently
affordable); see also Misra, supra note 5 (reporting that Alderman Ramirez-Rosa has used prerogative to
block redevelopment projects “to stave off displacement in his gentrifying neighborhood”).
21 See Sisson, supra note 4; see also, e.g., Editorial, A Great Way to Derail Progress on Affordable
Housing, CRAIN’S CHI. BUS. (Dec. 20, 2019, 2:49 PM), https://www.chicagobusiness.com/opinion/greatway-derail-progress-affordable-housing [https://perma.cc/V9GM-PEFB].
22 Supreme Court cases on the desegregation of public schools, from Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S.
717, 721 (1974), to Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District No. 1, 551 U.S.
701, 709–10 (2007), starkly illustrate why housing patterns matter. For a searchable database exploring
segregation’s persistence as recently as 2016, see Aaron Williams & Armand Emamdjomeh, America Is
More Diverse than Ever—But Still Segregated, WASH. POST (May 10, 2018),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/2018/national/segregation-us-cities/
[https://perma.cc/4QKU-TTDC]. See generally JOHN R. LOGAN & BRIAN J. STULTS, US2010 PROJECT,
THE PERSISTENCE OF SEGREGATION IN THE METROPOLIS: NEW FINDINGS FROM THE 2010 CENSUS 1
(2011), https://s4.ad.brown.edu/Projects/Diversity/Data/Report/report2.pdf [https://perma.cc/3DHNT8C4] (discussing the slow decline of segregation in the United States even through the decade of 2000–
2010, especially for Black Americans); Aldina Mesic, Lydia Franklin, Alex Cansever, Fiona Potter,
Anika Sharma, Anita Knopov & Michael Siegel, The Relationship Between Structural Racism and BlackWhite Disparities in Fatal Police Shootings at the State Level, 110 J. NAT’L MED. ASS’N 106 (2018)
(finding that segregation correlates with racial disparities in police shootings).
23 See infra Section II.A.
24 Recent WBEZ reporting on private mortgage lending in Chicago summed up the issue: “The
private market works in white communities. The private market does not work effectively in black
communities . . . .” Linda Lutton, Andrew Fan & Alden Loury, Where Banks Don’t Lend, WBEZ CHI.
(June 3, 2020), https://interactive.wbez.org/2020/banking/disparity/ [https://perma.cc/XS5L-L5E8]
(internal quotation marks omitted); see also ANDREW AURAND, DAN EMMANUEL, DANIEL THREET, INKA
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largely due to decades of deliberate government decision-making25—while
opposition often forms in white, higher-income neighborhoods.26
Consequently, developers rarely build affordable housing in the locations
that might otherwise further economic and racial integration. Instead, as has
traditionally been the case with public housing,27 affordable housing remains
largely confined to neighborhoods that perpetuate cities’ segregated status
quos.
This Note focuses on legislator prerogative at the local level—building
on the work of previous scholars who have discussed prerogative both
exclusively28 and as part of broader arguments29—and provides the first
comprehensive survey of prerogative’s national prevalence. This Note
argues that judicial intervention is likely necessary to compel legislative
reform that curbs prerogative’s segregative impact.
Part I introduces the mechanics of legislator prerogative, describes its
longstanding function in Chicago and Philadelphia, and surveys the national
landscape to demonstrate its widespread nature. Part II discusses
prerogative’s pernicious tendency to reinforce segregation through legislator
vetoes of affordable housing developments. Part III describes existing ideas
for legislative reform to curb prerogative and argues that these proposals fail
to sufficiently address prerogative’s entrenched nature. Finally, Part IV
offers judicial intervention as an alternative solution and discusses the scant
case law involving legal challenges to prerogative.

RAFI & DIANE YENTEL, NATIONAL LOW INCOME HOUSING COALITION, THE GAP: A SHORTAGE OF
AFFORDABLE
HOMES
13–17
(2020),
https://reports.nlihc.org/sites/default/files/gap/GapReport_2020.pdf [https://perma.cc/WVW5-VSLM] (breaking down affordabl- housing access by race).
25 For methodical expositions of government’s role in segregating cities across the country and why
this still matters today, see RICHARD ROTHSTEIN, THE COLOR OF LAW: A FORGOTTEN HISTORY OF HOW
OUR GOVERNMENT SEGREGATED AMERICA 17, 30–37 (2017).
26 This antidevelopment resistance is frequently described as NIMBY, or “Not In My Backyard.”
For a background primer on NIMBYism and its effect on affordable housing, see Corianne Payton Scally,
The Nuances of NIMBY: Context and Perceptions of Affordable Rental Housing Development, 49 URB.
AFFS. REV. 718, 721–23 (2012). Importantly, NIMBYism manifests itself in even the most “progressive”
of cities. Los Angeles Mayor Eric Garcetti aptly summarized this two-facedness: “If you keep saying,
‘No, I’m for this in the abstract but I don’t want it here,’ or, ‘This isn’t the right location,’ or ‘I’m liberal
but . . . ,’ then we’ll never solve the problem.” RANDY SHAW, GENERATION PRICED OUT: WHO GETS TO
LIVE IN THE NEW URBAN AMERICA 60–61 (2018); see infra Section I.B.
27 See Scally, supra note 26, at 738–39.
28 See Kate Walz & Patricia Fron, The Color of Power: How Local Control over the Siting of
Affordable Housing Shapes America, 12 DEPAUL J. SOC. JUST. 1, 3 (2019).
29 See Roderick M. Hills, Jr. & David Schleicher, Planning an Affordable City, 101 IOWA L. REV.
91, 112–15 (2015) [hereinafter Hills & Schleicher, Planning an Affordable City] (arguing centralized,
citywide planning would address the housing affordability crisis by, in part, solving the barriers posed by
aldermanic prerogative).
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I.

PREROGATIVE’S REACH

At a conceptual level, legislator prerogative is the devolution of power
to a single legislator over decisions in her district.30 In a prerogative regime,
this unilateral decision-making authority most frequently manifests in
legislative deference—whenever the entire legislative body votes on an issue
impacting a specific district, the body defers to the preference of the
individual legislator representing that district.31 Though less common, some
prerogative regimes also enable unilateral authority through administrative
deference—municipal administrative agencies making district-specific
decisions seek the opinion of that specific district’s legislator and defer
accordingly.32 In essence, prerogative regimes transform a legislator from a
representative within the broader polity into an executive of her district.33

30

Local legislator prerogative is conceptually akin to the former U.S. Senate practice of honoring
judicial blue slips, where the home state senators could veto a federal judicial nominee by withholding
their blue slips from the Senate Judiciary Committee Chair. Carl Tobias, Senate Blue Slips and Senate
Regular Order, 37 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. INTER ALIA 1, 1 (2018). Indeed, historical evidence suggests
prerogative has roots in this appointments tradition. See Fraud Too Easy., CHI. DAILY TRIB., Jan. 13,
1886, at 1 (describing how “aldermanic courtesy” gave Chicago aldermen the privilege of selecting the
judges of their own elections, where—given hypothetical Aldermen Smith and Brown—“Smith allowed
Brown to select his own judges and clerks one year and Brown allowed Smith to select his judges the
next year”); Two More Aldermen Brought In., CHI. TRIB., Mar. 27, 1892, at 4 (“As ‘Senatorial courtesy’
gives a Senator control over appointments in his State so does ‘Aldermanic courtesy’ give to the
Alderman the profits arising from the sale of petty franchises within his own territory.”); J.H.
HOLLANDER, THE FINANCIAL HISTORY OF BALTIMORE 239 (1899) (describing how prerogative in
Baltimore “permitted the practical appointment of Commissioners by the representatives of the ward
within which the vacancy occurred”); CITIZENS’ BUS. BUREAU OF MUN. RSCH., WHAT ABOUT ZONING?
502–03 (1922) (“[I]n Philadelphia there has developed ‘councilmanic courtesy’ the full implication of
which is that appointments from a certain ward or district are somehow subject to the visé of the
councilman from that bailiwick.”).
31 See ED BACHRACH & AUSTIN BERG, THE NEW CHICAGO WAY: LESSONS FROM OTHER BIG CITIES
20–21 (2019). Every city’s prerogative regime discussed in Part I features legislative deference save Los
Angeles.
32 Id. Chicago’s prerogative regime notably features both legislative and administrative deference,
while Los Angeles’ prerogative regime only featured administrative deference. For further context on Los
Angeles’ practice, which has since been stricken, see infra notes 121–126 and accompanying text.
33 See David Schleicher, City Unplanning, 122 YALE L.J. 1670, 1710–11 (2013) [hereinafter
Schleicher, City Unplanning] (describing how a prerogative regime forces developers to lobby the local
council member). Affecting the allocation of local power, municipal governance can take various
structural forms, though the council–manager and mayor–council forms predominate. A key difference
between these two systems is the separation of power, or lack thereof, between the legislative and
executive branches, especially as it relates to administrative implementation. For more information on
different types and configurations of local governments, see Benjamin Zimmermann, Does the Structure
of Local Government Matter?, FELS INST. OF GOV’T, UNIV. OF PA. (Dec. 7, 2017),
https://www.fels.upenn.edu/recap/posts/1475 [https://perma.cc/4UJT-YDQJ]; Cities 101—Forms of
Local Government, NAT’L LEAGUE OF CITIES (Dec. 13, 2016), https://www.nlc.org/resource/cities-101forms-of-local-government [https://perma.cc/JUZ2-82E9] (listing Chicago, Philadelphia, New York
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In practice, legislator prerogative is hardly ever a formal element of the
government’s structure; rather, it is almost universally an unwritten tradition
grounded in historical use.34 The unwritten nature of these rules makes it
difficult to discern when a legislative outcome or administrative decision is
the result of prerogative,35 posing visibility problems for outside observers,
including courts.36 In other words, differentiating between prerogative
deference and a nonprerogative vote on the merits can be difficult.37
Legislators employ prerogative most frequently in the land use
decision-making process, either through regulatory approvals (such as
zoning) or financing.38 Proponents of prerogative point to the normative
benefits of granting outsized influence over land use decisions to the
representatives of communities who feel the impact most directly,39 such as
fostering greater accountability between constituents and representatives.40
Prerogative may also reduce costs for developers by limiting the number of
political actors they must lobby.41 Opponents most commonly point to its

City, Baltimore, Nashville, San Francisco, and Los Angeles as all employing the mayor–council form of
local government).
34 Every example in Part I save Los Angeles exemplifies unwritten prerogative.
35 PEW CHARITABLE TRS., PHILADELPHIA’S COUNCILMANIC PREROGATIVE: HOW IT WORKS AND
WHY IT MATTERS 2 (2015), https://www.pewtrusts.org/-/media/assets/2015/08/philadelphiacouncilmanic-report--with-disclaimer.pdf [https://perma.cc/2UK9-5UT6] (describing the difficulties of
recognizing prerogative because it “happens behind the scenes”).
36 See infra Section I.A.
37
Cf. In re Hudson, No. 24-C-17-004307, slip op. at 1, 100 (Balt. City Cir. Ct. Dec. 20, 2019),
https://s3.amazonaws.com/sfdev-bucket/rolandpark/wp-content/uploads/2019/12/Memo-OpinionOverlook-at-Roland-Park-12.20.19.pdf [https://perma.cc/4SNN-D48M] (“The record shows one
Councilmember giving a high degree, but not absolute deference to the sponsoring Councilmember. It
also shows other Councilmembers either grappling with the issues or voting without explicit explanations
of their reasoning.”).
38 See infra Section I.A.
39 See, e.g., Alan Greenblatt, In Wake of Scandals, 2 Major Cities May Curb Politicians’ Power,
GOVERNING (May 2019), https://www.governing.com/topics/politics/gov-chicago-philadelphiacorruption.html [https://perma.cc/R6F5-JH8Y] (pointing to the efficiency argument for prerogative when
the entire city council does not have to deal with minor district-level issues); PEW CHARITABLE TRS.,
supra note 35, at 2 (noting prerogative can lead to development “more suitable for the neighborhood”).
40 See Misra, supra note 5.
41 See, e.g., Robert C. Ellickson, Suburban Growth Controls: An Economic and Legal Analysis,
86 YALE L.J. 385, 408 n.60 (1977) (“One cannot be certain, a priori, if this [prerogative] system promotes
‘influence’ or ‘majoritarian’ control. On the one hand, it reduces homeowners’ organization costs by, in
effect, reducing the size of the political unit; on the other hand, it lowers the administrative cost to
developers of acquiring influence by limiting the number of political decisionmakers who must be
approached.”); Nate Rau & Joey Garrison, As Development Booms, Nashville Council Goes Against
Planners
More
Often,
TENNESSEAN
(Jan.
21,
2017,
5:12
PM),
https://www.tennessean.com/story/news/politics/2017/01/21/development-booms-nashville-councilgoes-against-planners-more-often/96585874/ [https://perma.cc/3ML6-SQ58] (quoting a local land use
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potential for corruption, highlighting criminal convictions of city legislators
based on the political clout enabled by prerogative.42 But above all, the
debate over prerogative reflects the tension between citywide interests and
parochial preferences.
The following Sections describe traditions of legislator prerogative in
cities across the country. The first two Sections focus on Chicago and
Philadelphia, as they are the two cities with the most high-profile legacies of
prerogative.43 The third Section reviews prerogative in other cities to
demonstrate its nationwide scope.
A. Chicago
Chicago’s tradition of prerogative, locally known as “aldermanic
privilege,” is likely the most visible example nationally, in part because of
the large size of the Chicago City Council. Whereas local legislators in New
York and Los Angeles respectively represent 166,000 and 264,600 residents
each, Chicago’s fifty aldermen represent wards with only 54,000 residents.44
This council size further enables prerogative’s parochialism, where the
legislature defers to the local alderman in the name of local accountability.45
attorney who argued prerogative “give[s] developers a single point of contact to work with the
community”).
42 See, e.g., Greenblatt, supra note 39 (reporting how prerogative enables “sweetheart deals” where
legislators “ensur[e] that their friends and campaign contributors get more than their share of the
development action”); Austin Berg, Prohibition, Prostitution and Chicago’s Mini-Fiefdoms, ILL. POL’Y
(July 1, 2016), https://www.illinoispolicy.org/crony-chronicles-aldermanic-privilege-prohibitionprostitution-and-chicagos-mini-fiefdoms [https://perma.cc/9WJY-V8MQ] (pointing to the political clout
enabled by prerogative as “one root cause of Chicago corruption”); Claire Bushey, Chicago Aldermen
Might Be Even More Powerful than You Think, CRAIN’S CHI. BUS. (Jan. 30, 2019, 12:03 PM),
https://www.chicagobusiness.com/government/chicago-aldermen-might-be-even-more-powerful-youthink [https://perma.cc/DFW7-9TSM] (describing aldermanic convictions arising from prerogativeenabled extortion).
43 See, e.g., Greenblatt, supra note 39 (describing the political impact of high-profile indictments in
Chicago and Philadelphia on prerogative).
44 For a history of Chicago’s move to a fifty-ward single-district system, see Peter W. Colby & Paul
Michael Green, The Consolidation of Clout: The Vote Power of Chicago Democrats from Cermak to
Bilandic, ILL. ISSUES (Feb. 1979), https://www.lib.niu.edu/1979/ii790211.html [https://perma.cc/EYZ72TS3]. For a discussion of the potential democratic responsiveness due to smaller ward size, see Sisson,
supra note 4, arguing: “In theory, the extremely low ratio of residents-to-representatives on Chicago’s
City Council promotes diversity, and allows for greater responsiveness to local neighborhood needs.
Chicago aldermen represent roughly 54,000 residents each, where as representatives in New York (one
for every 166,600 residents) and Los Angeles (one for every 264,600 residents) have much greater
constituencies.”
45 See Alex Keefe, Pregnancy Tests? Pigeon Poo? What Chicago Aldermen Really Do, WBEZ
CURIOUS CITY (June 11, 2013, 5:21 PM), https://www.wbez.org/shows/wbez-news/pregnancy-testspigeon-poo-what-chicago-aldermen-really-do/4d099e24-9b47-4b9d-8d39-fbbc92d379c0
[https://perma.cc/WZR7-TWJY] (noting Chicago’s comparatively small constituency size per alderman
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As one alderman recently opined, “I often liken the City of Chicago [to] a
feudal system, where the mayor is sort of a de facto king. . . . And each
alderman is the lord . . . of their individual fiefdom.”46 Chicago’s version of
legislator prerogative is so ingrained in the city’s political culture that even
city administrative agencies defer to aldermanic requests.47 Some
commentators have called the practice “sacrosanct,”48 while others have
likened it to “virtual dictatorial power.”49
The local power of Chicago’s aldermen dates back to the city’s
founding in the mid-nineteenth century,50 when aldermen served as “trustees
of the ‘private affairs’ of their propertied constituents,”51 elected to ensure
the passage of public improvement projects through special assessments.52
enables aldermen to “micro-manage their wards”). A ProPublica investigation found that more than 90%
of Chicago ordinances from 2011 to 2018 were hyperlocal in nature, rather than pertaining to citywide
issues. Mick Dumke, At Chicago City Hall, the Legislative Branch Rarely Does Much Legislating,
PROPUBLICA ILL. (Feb. 25, 2019, 4:00 AM), https://www.propublica.org/article/chicago-city-councilaldermen-legislation-analysis-mayor-rahm-emanuel [https://perma.cc/5LFK-H2CZ]. In the words of
44th Ward Alderman Tom Tunney, “Take away the zoning power of the alderman in his or her
community, that’s not good. I don’t think it’s good because this building [City Hall] doesn’t know what’s
going on in 50 wards, you know?” Morell, supra note 12 (alteration in original).
46 Keefe, supra note 45 (alteration in original); see also Anthony Todd, Cock Block: Chicago
Alderman Blocks Opening of Chick-Fil-A in His Ward, CHICAGOIST (July 25, 2012, 3:10 PM),
https://chicagoist.com/2012/07/25/alderman_blocks_logan_square_chick-.php [https://perma.cc/Q7J5FWED] (describing the use of aldermanic prerogative as a form of political protest rather than as
boycotting business development).
47 See Thale, supra note 3; John J. Betancur & Douglas C. Gills, Community Development in
Chicago: From Harold Washington to Richard M. Daley, 594 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 92,
99 (2004) (“Aldermen have gained so much power in their respective wards that no public action takes
place there without their consent.”).
48 Edward McClelland, Shutting Down Lincoln Yards Was Aldermanic Privilege at Its Finest, CHI.
MAG. (Jan. 15, 2019), http://www.chicagomag.com/city-life/January-2019/Shutting-Down-LincolnYards-Was-Aldermanic-Privilege-at-its-Finest/ [https://perma.cc/P73M-MCS2].
49 Patrick T. Reardon & William Gaines, Council of Favors, CHI. TRIB., Nov. 3, 1997 (§ 1), at 9.
50 The earliest mention of aldermanic prerogative in the Chicago Tribune occurred in 1876, where
the paper noted the city council had rejected a candidate for Bridewell (Chicago’s city prison)
Commissioner because “Aldermanic ‘prerogative’ was infringed upon.” Political Notes, CHI. TRIB., Mar.
25, 1876, at 6. Throughout the late nineteenth century, prerogative in Chicago was frequently referred to
as “aldermanic courtesy.” See Fraud Too Easy., supra note 30; Two More Aldermen Brought In., supra
note 30; Repealing Special Assessments, CHI. TRIB., Apr. 23, 1893; Result of “Aldermanic Courtesy,”
CHI. DAILY TRIB., Apr. 4, 1892.
51 ROBIN L. EINHORN, PROPERTY RULES: POLITICAL ECONOMY IN CHICAGO, 1833–1872, at 90
(1991). This concept was known as segmentation, where Chicagoans at the time “demand[ed] that their
government represent property interests organized on a segmented basis” and insisted “there was no such
thing as a public interest that city government could pursue citywide.” Id. at 144. See generally Thale,
supra note 3 (describing the history of aldermanic privilege in Chicago).
52 EINHORN, supra note 51, at 86–87; see also Repealing Special Assessments, supra note 50, at 28
(describing how special assessments were subject to aldermanic courtesy “[w]hen an improvement is
confined to one ward and the Aldermen therefrom ask for the passage of a repealing ordinance”).
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By the 1890s, aldermen also commanded the power to revoke liquor licenses
in their wards and controlled the appointment of election judges in their own
districts.53 Over the following decades, prerogative grew to encompass land
use decisions affecting individual wards, such as zoning changes, sign
permits, and landscaping requests.54 Despite this far-reaching power,
aldermanic privilege in Chicago has no textual grounding in the city’s
Code,55 and courts have only recently started to formally acknowledge its
existence.56
The public has long recognized prerogative’s influence,57 and nonprofit
reports have also called for reform in Chicago.58 Unchecked, prerogative
lends itself to corruption in a city and state already infamous as models of
poor governance.59 In 2018, the editorial board of the Chicago Tribune
published a stark condemnation of aldermanic privilege, calling out
aldermen for enabling abuse by blindly affirming the preferences of their
53

See Sisson, supra note 4; Two More Aldermen Brought In., supra note 30.
See Sisson, supra note 4; Bushey, supra note 42 (“At least 11 of these day-to-day municipal tasks
require aldermanic approval, notice or a council ordinance . . . .”). See generally Yue Zhang, Boundaries
of Power: Politics of Urban Preservation in Two Chicago Neighborhoods, 47 URB. AFFS. REV. 511, 517–
22 (2011) (summarizing aldermanic prerogative’s development throughout the twentieth century).
55 See Keefe, supra note 45.
56 See infra Section I.A.
57 For example, in 2008 the Chicago Tribune ran an eight-part series investigating aldermanic
prerogative’s wide grip on the city. Neighborhoods for Sale, CHI. TRIB. (Apr. 21, 2015, 1:31 PM),
https://www.chicagotribune.com/investigations/chi-zoning-storygallery-storygallery.html
[https://perma.cc/7SDS-D27E]; see also Result of “Aldermanic Courtesy,” supra note 50, at 2
(“‘Aldermanic courtesy’ is, briefly, reciprocity; it’s you help me and I’ll help you.”); Traffic Control,
CHI. DAILY TRIB., Oct. 23, 1956, at 16 (arguing for a city ordinance that would shift traffic-control powers
away from aldermen in part because “[a]ldermanic privilege has divided the city into 50 communities, in
which local convenience and prejudices will always be given priority over the needs of the city as a
whole”); Manuel Galvan, Proposed Zoning Revamp Takes Aim at Aldermen, CHI. TRIB., Oct. 29, 1987,
at B1 (describing a proposed zoning ordinance where sponsor Alderman Danny Davis, who is now a
Member of Congress, argued the ordinance would “diminish the possibility of abuse of aldermanic
privilege”).
58 See, e.g., THE CIVIC FED’N, FINANCIAL CHALLENGES FOR THE NEXT CHICAGO MAYOR AND C ITY
COUNCIL:
OPTIONS
AND
RECOMMENDATIONS
63–64
(2019),
https://www.civicfed.org/sites/default/files/chicagofiscalchallenges2019_full.pdf
[https://perma.cc/U4N6-CNEV]; CHI. AREA FAIR HOUS. ALL., A CITY FRAGMENTED: HOW RACE,
POWER, AND ALDERMANIC PREROGATIVE SHAPE CHICAGO’S NEIGHBORHOODS 3 (2018).
59 Between 1976 and 2018, there have been 1,750 public corruption convictions in the Northern
District of Illinois alone. DICK SIMPSON, THOMAS J. GRADEL, MICHAEL DIRKSEN & MARCO ROSAIRE
ROSSI, UNIV. ILL. AT CHI., DEP’T POL. SCI., ANTI-CORRUPTION REPORT NO. 12, CHICAGO STILL THE
CORRUPTION CAPITAL 2 (2020), https://pols.uic.edu/wp-zontent/uploads/sites/273/2020/02/
Corruption.Rpt_12.Complete.pdf [https://perma.cc/WGN2-SVCY]; see also Chris Bentley & Jeremy
Hobson, How Chicago Politics Produced a Deeply Entrenched Culture of Corruption, WBUR (Feb. 28,
2019), https://www.wbur.org/hereandnow/2019/02/28/chicago-politics-corruption [https://perma.cc/
PP7T-FEJL].
54
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colleagues.60 The editorial board of Crain’s Chicago Business similarly
identified aldermanic privilege as “a toxin infecting Chicago’s body
politic.”61 But Mayor Lightfoot’s reform efforts will likely still prove
difficult to enact because even progressive aldermen elected alongside her
“have discovered how to flex their muscles” through prerogative in pursuit
of their own agendas.62 Despite recent calls for reform, aldermanic privilege
remains alive and well, demonstrating the difficulties of unrooting
prerogative.63
B. Philadelphia
Philadelphia’s practice of legislator prerogative, known locally as
“councilmanic prerogative,” is closest to Chicago’s in terms of notoriety.64
Philadelphia’s city council consists of ten members elected by district and
seven members elected at-large.65 When it comes to land use decisions
requiring full council votes, such as sale of city lots and zoning, the districtbased legislators wield prerogative power—the rest of the council will defer
to the decision of the council member where the land use decision is
situated.66 A Pew report on prerogative in Philadelphia summarized the
tradition as “I won’t mess with your turf if you won’t mess with mine.”67 Just
like Chicago, the practice is unwritten—nothing in the city charter or state
law mentions prerogative or definitively gives council members unilateral

60

Editorial Board, Aldermanic Privilege Run Amok, CHI. TRIB. (July 13, 2018, 2:55 PM),
https://www.chicagotribune.com/opinion/editorials/ct-edit-aldermanic-prerogative-privilege-affordablehousing-chicago-20180711-story.html [https://perma.cc/SW5G-LHP6].
61 Editorial, A Great Way to Derail Progress on Affordable Housing, CRAIN’S CHI. BUS. (Dec. 20,
2019, 2:49 PM), https://www.chicagobusiness.com/opinion/great-way-derail-progress-affordablehousing [https://perma.cc/7R7P-B5RZ].
62 Id.; see also supra note 20 and accompanying text (overviewing examples of progressive aldermen
wielding prerogative).
63 See Heather Cherone, At 6-Month Mark, Lightfoot’s Effort to Scale Back Aldermanic Prerogative
a Work in Progress, DAILY LINE (Nov. 20, 2019), https://thedailyline.net/chicago/11/20/2019/at-6month-mark-lightfoots-effort-to-scale-back-aldermanic-prerogative-a-work-in-progress/
[https://perma.cc/3DKZ-ATLU] (acknowledging that Lightfoot’s Executive Order did not strike “at the
heart” of prerogative).
64 See Greenblatt, supra note 39 (“In both Chicago and Philadelphia, members of the city council are
facing criminal charges that stem from development decisions.”).
65
How Is the City of Philadelphia Government Structured?, MOVING PHILLY FORWARD,
https://www.movingphillyforward.org/philadelphia-government-structure [https://perma.cc/JZ89S78E].
66 PEW CHARITABLE TRS., supra note 35, at 3.
67 Id.
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veto power.68 And further like Chicago, council members have praised
prerogative for fostering local accountability.69
Philadelphia’s prerogative tradition dates back to at least 1919.70 A
recent examination of city votes demonstrates the tradition is stronger than
ever: of the city council’s votes on 1,342 total ordinances between 2008 and
2014, 730 ordinances were subject to prerogative.71 Strikingly, legislators
cast only six total nay votes within this latter subset.72 Just four ordinances
failed to receive unanimous support, and those four still passed.73
Philadelphia has recently instituted land use reforms, including a new zoning
code in 201174 and a new land bank in 2013.75 The city specifically designed
the land bank “to transform a dysfunctional system of property disposition”76
and further reformed it as recently as October 2019.77 But despite these
attempts at reform, Philadelphia has not yet touched a major source of its
problems—councilmanic prerogative still reigns.78
Courts in Pennsylvania have started acknowledging the practice, albeit
only recently.79 In January 2020, Philadelphia’s prerogative tradition flared
up when federal prosecutors indicted a council member for wire fraud,
68

Id.
Council members argue “they can stop or alter projects that are not good fits for neighborhoods,”
and the city council president argues “[n]obody knows a community better than the district council person
that represents it.” Id. at 1.
70 Id. at 3.
71 Id. at 17–18.
72 Id.
73 Id.
74 See Jake Blumgart, Zoning (Philadelphia), THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF GREATER PHILA. (2017),
https://philadelphiaencyclopedia.org/archive/zoning-philadelphia/ [https://perma.cc/V9JP-FQY5].
75 See Melissa Romero, What You Need to Know About the Philadelphia Land Bank, CURBED PHILA.
(Dec. 10, 2015, 12:30 PM), https://philly.curbed.com/2015/12/10/9892464/philadelphia-land-bankwhat-you-need-to-know [https://perma.cc/9P3X-3AUB].
76 Tony Abraham, Philadelphia Just Became the Largest City in America with a Land Bank,
GENEROCITY (Dec. 9, 2015, 3:30 PM), https://generocity.org/philly/2015/12/09/philadelphia-land-bank/
[https://perma.cc/H57U-UL82].
77 Phila., Pa., Bill 190606-AA (Oct. 24, 2019); see also Press Release, Comm. of Seventy, City
Council Passes Reform to Vacant Land Sale Process (Oct. 31, 2019), https://seventy.org/media/pressreleases/2019/10/31/city-council-passes-reform-to-vacant-land-sale-process
[https://perma.cc/B83BWBWV].
78 See Julia Terruso, The Primary Election Issue Most Philly Voters Have Never Heard Of:
Councilmanic Prerogative, PHILA. INQUIRER (Feb. 27, 2019), https://www.inquirer.com/news/
philadelphia/councilmanic-prerogative-city-council-darrell-clarke-development-kenyatta-johnsongentrification-building-primary-20190227.html [https://perma.cc/6RC3-MB4Z]; Ernest Owens,
Opinion, Want to Reduce Political Corruption in Philly? End Councilmanic Prerogative Now., PHILA.
MAG. (Feb. 5, 2020, 12:27 PM), https://www.phillymag.com/news/2020/02/05/kenyatta-johnsonindictment-councilmanic-prerogative/ [https://perma.cc/N4NZ-73LA].
79 See infra Section I.A.
69
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accusing him of abusing his prerogative for bribes in connection with zoning
demands from a charter school.80 Local media outlets, including the
Philadelphia Inquirer, have called for prerogative’s demise and an end to
corruption.81 But if history is any indication, the public outcry will dissipate,
and prerogative will continue to loom over Philadelphia governance.82
C. National Prevalence
Although prerogative is most famous in Chicago and Philadelphia,
many other cities across the country employ similar regimes. Prerogative is
far more pervasive than commentators currently recognize, largely because
other cities’ traditions are less visible than prerogative in Chicago and
Philadelphia. Nonetheless, the following cities illustrate prerogative’s
nationwide reach and demonstrate that it likely exists on an even broader
scale than previously realized.

80 Press Release, U.S. Att’y’s Off., E. Dist. of Pa., Philadelphia City Councilman Kenyatta Johnson
and His Wife Indicted in Wide-Ranging Fraud and Bribery Case Also Involving Former Universal
Company Executives (Jan. 29, 2020), https://www.justice.gov/usao-edpa/pr/philadelphia-citycouncilman-kenyatta-johnson-and-his-wife-indicted-wide-ranging-fraud [https://perma.cc/5J5G-95R5];
Jake Blumgart, Why Philly Can’t Quit the Tradition at the Center of FBI’s Kenyatta Johnson Case,
WHYY (Jan. 30, 2020), https://whyy.org/articles/why-philly-council-still-backs-the-tradition-at-thecenter-of-kenyatta-johnsons-fbi-case/
[https://perma.cc/473C-6A57];
Ryan
Briggs,
Philly
Councilmember Kenyatta Johnson Corruption Trial Scheduled for 2021, WHYY (Apr. 2, 2020),
https://whyy.org/articles/philly-councilmember-kenyatta-johnson-corruption-trial-scheduled-for-2021/
[https://perma.cc/7E97-74JW] (Johnson’s trial is scheduled for January 2021). Further demonstrating the
connection between Philadelphia political corruption and prerogative, “all six City Councilmembers who
have been criminally convicted since 1981 were charged over matters that concerned councilmanic
prerogative.” Owens, supra note 78.
81 See, e.g., Kyle Sammin, Councilmanic Prerogative Is Philadelphia’s Invitation to Corruption,
PHILA. INQUIRER (Feb. 17, 2020, 6:00 AM), https://www.inquirer.com/opinion/commentary/
councilmanic-prerogative-kenyatta-johnson-philadelphia-20200217.html
[https://perma.cc/Q9HMUWKY]; Jon Geeting, R.I.P Councilmanic Prerogative, PHILA. CITIZEN (Feb. 2, 2020),
https://thephiladelphiacitizen.org/councilmanic-prerogative-planning/ [https://perma.cc/4UUG-83WD];
Owens, supra note 78.
82 See PEW CHARITABLE TRS., supra note 35, at 23.
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New York City engages in a prerogative practice known as “member
deference.”83 Dating back to at least the 1890s,84 member deference consists
of unwritten agreements where local legislators control land use decisions in
their districts.85 The city’s Uniform Land Use Review Procedure partially
enables member deference by requiring hyperlocal review of land use
decisions. The city’s planning department is required to forward any
development materials to the affected borough president, community board,
and borough board.86 By giving these stakeholders formal but merely
advisory review, their perspectives can inform the individual council
member who actually wields member deference.87
For example, in fall 2019, New York City considered replacing the
infamous Rikers Island jail with four borough-based alternatives.88 The jail
planned for Brooklyn faced opposition from both the borough president and
the local community board.89 Despite their opposition, the local council
member supported the Brooklyn jail and specifically noted the power he
wielded through member deference during a closed-door meeting with his

83

See Alec Schierenbeck, End the Council’s Land-Use Veto: The Path to a More Affordable, Fairer
New York, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Oct. 22, 2019), https://www.nydailynews.com/opinion/ny-end-thecouncils-land-use-veto-20191022-3mfmgfdbmfaflgmgtnovvbitdq-story.html [https://perma.cc/XQ2LEZQT] (describing member deference and calling to end its use in New York City); Roderick M. Hills,
Jr. & David Schleicher, Building Coalitions out of Thin Air: Transferable Development Rights and
‘Constituency Effects’ in Land Use Law, J. LEGAL ANALYSIS (forthcoming 2020) (manuscript at 56–58),
https://papers.ssrn.com/a=3504372 [https://perma.cc/E7SH-RK4V] [hereinafter Hills & Schleicher,
Building Coalitions out of Thin Air] (describing prerogative in New York City).
84 Like Chicago, the historical predecessor of New York City’s member deference was also called
aldermanic courtesy. See, e.g., Busy Session of Aldermen, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 18, 1899, at 14; “Aldermanic
Courtesy” Reconsidered, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 12, 1893, at 9; They Felt Like Rebuking, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 5,
1893, at 9.
85 Samar Khurshid, On Land Use, Johnson Promises ‘Deference’ to Members but ‘No Veto,’
GOTHAM GAZETTE (Mar. 10, 2018), https://www.gothamgazette.com/city/7530-on-land-use-johnsonpromises-deference-to-members-but-no-veto [https://perma.cc/8KBV-FWQF]; see also John Mangin,
Ethnic Enclaves and the Zoning Game, 36 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 419, 430 n.42 (2018) (“Though not
formalized, the City Council typically defers to the member of the affected district when determining how
to vote on an action.”).
86 N.Y.C. CHARTER § 197-c(b) (2004), http://www.nyc.gov/html/records/pdf/section
%201133_citycharter.pdf [https://perma.cc/YM44-KMAM].
87 Mangin, supra note 85, at 430 n.42 (describing the advisory versus deferential mechanics of the
New York City Uniform Land Use Review Procedure).
88 See Caroline Spivack, Rikers Island Closure and Borough-Based Jail Plan, Explained, CURBED
N.Y. (Feb. 26, 2020, 12:47 PM), https://ny.curbed.com/2019/7/9/18307769/nyc-rikers-island-closureborough-based-jails-plan-explained [https://perma.cc/K2AW-X6GE].
89 Noah Goldberg, What Happened with the Jail Plan This Year?, BROOK. DAILY EAGLE (Dec. 30,
2019),
https://brooklyneagle.com/articles/2019/12/30/what-happened-with-the-jail-plan-this-year/
[https://perma.cc/7XW9-AEAE].
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colleagues from the Brooklyn delegation.90 One month after his remarks,
prerogative seemingly worked its magic when the city council approved the
plan.91
Further down the coast in Maryland, the Baltimore City92 and County93
Councils each employ their own prerogative regimes, both called
“councilmanic courtesy.”94 At the county level, prerogative remains such a
fixture that council members publicly extol its virtues95 despite public
backlash.96 At the city level, councilmanic courtesy proved influential when
a local development company proposed redeveloping Baltimore’s Port
Covington and asked for the third largest tax-increment financing deal in the

90 The local Brooklyn Eagle obtained a recording of the meeting, where Council Member Levin said:
“[I]f there’s any issues that you have that are coming to mind through this process, please let me
know . . . . [A]s you know, the way that with land-use there’s some member deference.” Brooklyn Eagle
Staff, Transcript: Councilmember Stephen Levin on ‘Member Deference,’ BROOK. DAILY EAGLE (Sept.
10, 2019), https://brooklyneagle.com/articles/2019/09/10/transcript-councilmember-stephen-levin-onmember-deference/ [https://perma.cc/58XC-7EXU].
91 Press Release, N.Y.C. Council, Council Votes on Historic Legislation to Close Rikers Island (Oct.
17, 2019), https://council.nyc.gov/press/2019/10/17/1818/ [https://perma.cc/DZ97-U9GX]. See
generally Matthews Haag, N.Y.C. Votes to Close Rikers. Now Comes the Hard Part., N.Y. TIMES (Oct.
17, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/10/17/nyregion/rikers-island-closing-vote.html [https://
perma.cc/B4N7-8YQC] (describing the politics and consequence of closing Rikers).
92 See Jeff Fraley, Opinion, Transform Baltimore Must Not Eliminate Space for Industry, BALT. BUS.
J.
(Sept.
23,
2016,
11:21
AM),
https://www.bizjournals.com/baltimore/blog/realestate/2016/09/opiniontransform-baltimore-must-not-eliminate.html [https://perma.cc/5BCK-GL97].
93 See David Plymyer, Time to Get Rid of a Relic of Baltimore County’s Checkered Past, FORWARD
BALT. (Dec. 10, 2019), https://forwardbaltimore.com/2019/12/10/time-to-get-rid-of-a-relic-of-baltimorecountys-checkered-past/ [https://perma.cc/S3U3-LHLA]; Pamela Wood, Baltimore County Council to
Vote
on
Rezoning
Decisions,
BALT.
SUN
(Aug.
28,
2016),
https://www.baltimoresun.com/maryland/baltimore-county/bs-md-co-zoning-vote-20160828-story.html
[https://perma.cc/J7XQ-CCBL].
94 Councilmanic courtesy is also allegedly employed in other Maryland counties. See Terry v. Cnty.
Council, No. 2756, 2019 WL 3453242, at *7 n.12 (Md. Spec. App. July 31, 2019) (finding an allegation
of councilmanic courtesy in Bowie, the largest city in Prince George’s County, unfounded); Howard’s
Councilmanic Discourtesy, BALT. SUN (May 18, 1992), https://www.baltimoresun.com/news/bs-xpm1992-05-18-1992139203-story.html [https://perma.cc/Q9AC-QWXW] (describing councilmanic
courtesy in Howard County); Ruth Marcus, P.G. Proceeds with Caution on Development, WASH. POST,
Oct. 29, 1984, at A1 (describing councilmanic courtesy in Prince George’s County).
95 For example, Baltimore County Council Member David Marks pointed to the accountability
justification: “If we did not have Councilmanic courtesy, you could have a situation where four Council
members might override the district representative, and the voters would have no way to hold those four
other Council members accountable.” See Klaus Philipsen, Interview with Councilman Who Wants to
Pull Plug on Mighty Developer, CMTY. ARCHITECT DAILY (June 29, 2017), https://
communityarchitectdaily.blogspot.com/2017/06/interview-with-councilman-who-wants-to.html
[https://perma.cc/V8Q7-42QE].
96 See Plymyer, supra note 93 (concluding a discussion of councilmanic courtesy’s impact by noting
the “sooner this Baltimore County tradition dies, the better”).
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country’s history—a request subject to major local controversy.97 One former
council member explicitly justified his support out of respect for
councilmanic courtesy, explaining that he voted for the deal because the
South Baltimore council member who represented Port Covington also
favored it.98
A 2017 lawsuit filed by North Baltimore neighborhood groups further
demonstrates prerogative’s local impact. The neighborhood groups attacked
councilmanic courtesy, arguing the city had impermissibly approved an
upscale apartment project. The neighborhood groups cited to a Baltimore
land use committee hearing transcript in which a council member would not
even consider the merits of the project because it was located outside her
district.99 The council member deferred: “This particular project is in the
Fifth District. It’s the decision of the Fifth District Councilperson. And on
that note, I’ll stop here, and my vote is a yes.”100 In dicta, the judge
characterized prerogative as “inconsistent” with a legislator’s obligation to
impartially decide.101 Nonetheless, the record showed the difficulty of
distinguishing between absolute deference and a decision on the merits, and
the court declined to decide on prerogative’s effect, vacating the project’s
approval on other grounds.102
Moving inland, Nashville’s practice of prerogative is also called
councilmanic courtesy and exists as an unwritten tradition dating back at
least to the 1970s.103 As a consolidated government with surrounding
97
See, e.g., Ron Cassie, Tomorrowland: Port Covington Will Be Like Nothing Baltimore Has Ever
Seen. But at What Cost?, BALT. MAG. (Dec. 4, 2017), https://www.baltimoremagazine.com/
2017/12/4/tomorrowland-the-future-of-port-covington-in-baltimore [https://perma.cc/QU3C-FHP5].
98 Id.
99 In re Hudson, No. 24-C-17-004307, slip op. at 1, 44 (Balt. City Cir. Ct. Dec. 20 2019),
https://s3.amazonaws.com/sfdev-bucket/rolandpark/wp-content/uploads/2019/12/Memo-OpinionOverlook-at-Roland-Park-12.20.19.pdf [https://perma.cc/NF2V-P9LX]. See generally Ed Gunts, Judge
Rules the Controversial Overlook at Roland Park Apartment Project Can’t Be Built, BALT. FISHBOWL
(Dec. 23, 2019), https://baltimorefishbowl.com/stories/judge-rules-the-controversial-overlook-at-rolandpark-apartment-project-cant-be-built/ [https://perma.cc/W25N-N5DF] (describing the backdrop and
community implications of the lawsuit).
100 Hudson, No. 24-C-17-004307, slip op. at 44.
101 Id. at 100; see also Nestor M. Davidson, Localist Administrative Law, 126 YALE L.J. 564, 603
(2017) (describing how “some courts review individualized determinations by local legislative bodies as
though the relevant action was actually ‘quasi-judicial’”).
102 Hudson, No. 24-C-17-004307, slip op. at 100 (“Because the Court is reversing the decision on
other grounds, the Court declines to decide in isolation whether this record requires reversal on the ground
that the Committee’s decision was improperly affected by councilmanic courtesy.”).
103 See Clariday v. State, 552 S.W.2d 759, 762–63 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1976) (“[T]his case
undoubtedly was precipitated by the existence of a local practice known as ‘councilmanic courtesy.’
Under this practice, proposed zoning and sewer ordinance changes were subject to veto by the council
member in whose district the proposed changes would be effected.”); C.J. HEIN, JOYCE M. KEYS & G.M.
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Davidson County, courtesy in Nashville is particularly critical to zoning
votes because of the council’s size at forty members—the third largest in the
country.104 Although the region has a Metropolitan Planning Commission
tasked with maintaining a development plan and providing zoning
recommendations in adherence to that plan,105 prerogative’s inherent
parochialism regularly overrides the Commission’s regional approach to
planning.106 One council member opined in a 2018 interview that he could
not think of a single zoning bill where he did not receive deference.107
Tennessee journalists have called councilmanic courtesy “as strong today as
ever,”108 leading to “pre-ordained” outcomes in zoning decisions.109
On the West Coast, San Francisco’s Board of Supervisors wields
“supervisorial prerogative.”110 San Francisco’s prerogative impacts land use
decisions ranging from housing construction111 to bikeshare expansion.112
Although supervisorial prerogative has only emerged in recent years,113 it has
quickly become a focal point in the city’s housing plight. For example, a
local coalition supporting affordable housing called YIMBY, or “Yes In My
ROBBINS, REGIONAL GOVERNMENTAL ARRANGEMENTS IN METROPOLITAN AREAS: NINE CASE STUDIES
178 (1974) (“Within the council a ritual known as councilmanic courtesy provides a piecemeal decisionmaking tool in zoning decisions. . . . Among the thirty-five district council members, zoning matters are
automatically decided on the basis of the position of that district’s council representative.”). See generally
Ola Johansson, Changing Governance, Business Elites, and Local Regulation in Nashville 92, 104, 121–
22 (Aug. 2004) (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Tennessee, Knoxville) (on file with journal) (describing
the historical relevance of councilmanic courtesy on Nashville’s development).
104 See Michael Karlick, Interview #78: Nashville, TN Councilman Colby Sledge, CITY COUNCIL
CHRONS. (Jan. 14, 2018), https://councilchronicles.com/2018/01/14/interview-78-nashville-tncouncilman-colby-sledge-with-podcast/ [https://perma.cc/NY76-S7HB] (“[W]hen you have a legislative
body that’s this large dealing with land-use issues, it tends to be the unwritten rule.”).
105 NASHVILLE, TENN., CODE § 11.504(h) (Oct. 4, 1988).
106 See Rau & Garrison, supra note 41 (“Davis has managed to pass the zoning bills in the face of
opposition from the commission by evoking a longstanding tradition of councilmanic courtesy.”).
107 Karlick, supra note 104.
108 Rau & Garrison, supra note 41.
109 Peter White, Gentrification in North Nashville, TENN. TRIB. (Mar. 7, 2019),
https://tntribune.com/investigative-stories/gentrification-in-north-nashville
[https://perma.cc/AQS3JL35].
110 See Randy Shaw, The Failure of District Elections, BEYOND CHRON (Jan. 7, 2020),
http://beyondchron.org/the-failure-of-district-elections/ [https://perma.cc/HK9E-4KC4].
111 Mike Ege, How San Francisco’s District Boundaries Keep Housing Scarce, BAY CITY BEACON
(July 22, 2018), https://www.thebaycitybeacon.com/politics/how-san-francisco-s-district-boundarieskeep-housing-scarce/article_cf0a8306-8dfc-11e8-b2a9-5f7463e49399.html
[https://perma.cc/87TQZ2MA].
112 Jane Natoli, Show, Don’t Tell, MEDIUM (Aug. 13, 2018), https://medium.com/@wafoli/showdont-tell-9d1872240c31 [https://perma.cc/9SJW-5KYX].
113 Ege, supra note 111 (describing supervisorial prerogative as an “emerging practice” and sourcing
its “behind-the-scenes” practice).
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Backyard” Action asked supervisor candidates if they would adhere to
supervisorial prerogative and received responses ranging from full to
conditional support.114 Prerogative also recently sparked controversy in the
city’s Mission neighborhood when a developer wanted to build a seventyfive-unit tower in place of an existing laundromat he owned.115 The city first
forced him to spend $23,000 conducting a historical study of the laundromat,
though there was little reason to believe it merited landmark status.116 Then,
the Board of Supervisors voted to indefinitely delay the project to analyze its
shadow impact on an adjacent school playground.117 The developer sued,
arguing the Board of Supervisors had effectively delegated approval
authority to the local supervisor as a matter of prerogative, a claim further
substantiated by the San Francisco Planning Department’s prior approval of
the project.118 The suit heightened public attention to the “sheer
ridiculousness”119 of the process, which in turn prompted city officials to
quietly push the project through and moot the suit.120
Los Angeles city council members do not wield prerogative on land use
decisions like zoning, but they previously exercised a rare codified form of
prerogative through a “letter of acknowledgment” requirement.121 Whereas
114 Compare Gordon Mar: Candidate – San Francisco District 4 Supervisor, YIMBY ACTION,
https://yimbyaction.org/questionnaire/gordon-mar/ [https://perma.cc/Z2EA-HN2V] (“[S]upervisorial
prerogative . . . speaks to the core value of district elections: that communities and neighborhoods should
have a voice in the decisions that directly impact them.”), with Rafael Mandelman: Candidate – San
Francisco District 8 Supervisor, YIMBY ACTION, https://yimbyaction.org/questionnaire/rafaelmandelman/ [https://perma.cc/A4S5-38Z3] (“[S]ome matters . . . [should] outweigh so-called
‘supervisorial prerogative.’ The siting of an affordable housing development is one obvious example.”).
115 Julian Mark, Is the Wash Club Building a Historic Resource to SF’s Mission?, MISSION LOCAL
(Feb. 21, 2018), https://missionlocal.org/2018/02/is-the-wash-club-building-a-historic-resource-to-sfsmission/ [https://perma.cc/7ZD4-DUTW].
116 Joe Eskenazi, The Strange and Terrible Saga of San Francisco’s ‘Historic Laundromat’
Represents the Worst of Planning and Development in This Town, MISSION LOCAL (June 26, 2018),
https://missionlocal.org/2018/06/the-strange-and-terrible-saga-of-san-franciscos-historic-laundromatrepresents-the-worst-of-planning-and-development-in-this-town/ [https://perma.cc/3BTY-9L9F].
117 One anonymous city official commented that the city’s demand for a shadow study was
“ludicrous.” Id.
118 Complaint at 2–3, RRTI, Inc. v. City of San Francisco, No. CPF-18-516301 (Cal. Super. Ct. Aug.
20, 2018), https://www.docdroid.net/wJNkdqI/sf-1088649-v1-rrti-verified-petition-for-writ-of-mandatecomplaint-for-damages-injunctive-and-declaratory-relief.pdf#page=3 [https://perma.cc/NXF5-A4P9].
119 Eskenazi, supra note 116.
120 See Julian Mark, How the Developer of SF’s ‘Historic’ Laundromat Quietly Won, MISSION
LOCAL (Feb. 4, 2019), https://missionlocal.org/2019/02/how-the-developer-of-sfs-historic-laundromatquietly-won/ [https://perma.cc/Z9Z3-FEFU].
121 These city-level public financing options include its Affordable Housing Managed Pipeline
Program and Proposition HHH Loan program. See Council District Office Letter of Acknowledgement,
L.A. HOUS. & CMTY. INV. DEP’T (2017), https://hcidla.lacity.org/council-office-letter-acknowledgement
[https://perma.cc/5YRP-WSG6].
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many prerogative regimes consist of the legislative body deferring to a single
legislator, Los Angeles’ regime consisted of an administrative body
deferring.122 In this case, the municipal agency that administered public
financing for housing developments deferred to the legislator, and if a
council member withheld the letter of acknowledgment—a requirement to
access the city’s public financing for affordable housing developments—the
project would not be financed.123 Rather than relying on an unwritten
tradition, the city council codified the letter of acknowledgment requirement
in an ordinance.124 But, after much public consternation, state-level
legislative pushback, and potential legal liability, the city council voted to
curtail this prerogative practice by striking the letter requirement in 2018.125
As further detailed in Part IV, Los Angeles represents one of the only
instances where legislators have curbed their own prerogative power.126
While these cities illustrate prominent examples of prerogative, this
Section’s overview only scratches the surface. In cities like St. Louis,127
Milwaukee,128 Cleveland,129 and Springfield, Illinois,130 prerogative is hardly

122 Emily Alpert Reyes, L.A. Lawmakers Can Block Homeless Housing Projects by Simply
Withholding a Key Letter, L.A. TIMES (Mar. 12, 2018, 4:00 AM), https://www.latimes.com/
local/lanow/la-me-ln-council-power-20180312-story.html [https://perma.cc/F852-GSW6].
123 Id. City administrators have argued the letters “ensure that Council [member] Offices are aware
of the agencies applying in their District,” paralleling similar accountability justifications across the
country. Memorandum from Richard H. Llewellyn, Jr., Interim City Admin. Off., to Mayor & City
Council 8 (May 16, 2017), https://clkrep.lacity.org/onlinedocs/2017/17-0090_rpt_CAO_05-16-2017.pdf
[https://perma.cc/9LKR-6E5Y].
124 See SHAW, supra note 26, at 61.
125 Emily Alpert Reyes, L.A. Will Eliminate ‘Veto’ Provision for Homeless and Affordable Housing
to Keep State Funding, L.A. TIMES (Oct. 16, 2018, 12:40 PM), https://www.latimes.com/local/lanow/lame-ln-homeless-letter-20181017-story.html [https://perma.cc/4CDC-UVBN].
126 See infra Section I.B.
127 See Sarah Harney, Are City Councils a Relic of the Past?, GOVERNING (Apr. 2003),
https://www.governing.com/topics/politics/Are-City-Councils-Relic-Past.html [https://perma.cc/PAZ79AVB] (describing how St. Louis’s tradition of aldermanic privilege has enabled parochialism).
128 See State v. Tronca, 267 N.W.2d 216, 218 (Wis. 1978) (challenging the denial of a liquor license
due to prerogative); JASON ADKINS, UNHAPPY DAYS FOR MILWAUKEE ENTREPRENEURS: BREW CITY
REGULATIONS MAKE IT HARD FOR BUSINESSES TO ACHIEVE THE HIGH LIFE 14–17 (2010) (describing
how aldermanic privilege “allows aldermen to act like petty despots in their districts”); Dave Begel,
Common Council Should Get Out of Liquor License Business, ONMILWAUKEE (Jan. 14, 2013, 3:09 PM),
https://onmilwaukee.com/bars/articles/liquorlicences.html [https://perma.cc/8MPS-HAEP] (describing
aldermanic privilege in conjunction with granting liquor licenses).
129
WILLIAM E. NELSON, JR. & PHILIP J. MERANTO, ELECTING BLACK MAYORS 356 (1977)
(describing how Cleveland’s chairmen of council committees invoked councilmanic courtesy to block
legislation).
130 Editorial, Our Opinion: City Council’s Inconsistency Is Troubling, ST. J.-REG. (Oct. 29, 2009,
7:51 PM), https://www.sj-r.com/x1717113033/Our-Opinion-City-council-s-inconsistency-is-troubling
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noted, but occasional media coverage suggests it exists. Due to prerogative’s
typically unwritten nature, commentators have little to reference beyond
media stories or legislators’ public comments. Furthermore, because
prerogative is conceptually only a matter of deference, it is not necessarily
apparent to outsiders—distinguishing between a legislator exercising
prerogative and a unanimous nonprerogative vote on the merits can be a tall
order.131 Nonetheless, the foregoing survey demonstrates prerogative’s
national grasp on local political decision-making.
II. LEGISLATOR VETOES
While the prerogative regimes just reviewed have long been associated
with heightened risk of corruption, prerogative also enables legislators to
perpetuate existing patterns of racial segregation by blocking the
development of affordable housing—a phenomenon that should be
associated with the term “local veto.” Extensive scholarship has discussed
local governments’ efforts to block affordable housing development, often
describing municipalities as exercising local vetoes.132 For example,
Professor Stacy Seicshnaydre described a 2007 housing bill proposal in
Louisiana that required approval from a parish governing authority to
allocate tax credits as creating a local veto.133 In 2016, the Internal Revenue
Service (IRS) used the term in a formal ruling when it announced that it
“neither requires nor encourages” state housing agencies to “honor local
vetoes” when allocating low-income housing tax credits.134 In short, this term
[https://perma.cc/8HT9-4HDB] (reporting a “classic case of aldermanic privilege” when the city council
made a liquor-licensing exception).
131 On the issue of legislative intent writ large, Justice Antonin Scalia aptly noted that “discerning
the subjective motivation of those enacting the statute is, to be honest, almost always an impossible task.
The number of possible motivations, to begin with, is not binary, or indeed even finite.” Edwards v.
Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 636–37 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
132 See, e.g., Philip D. Tegeler, Housing Segregation and Local Discretion, 3 J.L. & POL’Y 209, 217
(1994) (describing a requirement for a locality to document its need for low-income housing as “a
standardless local veto over federally funded public housing”); Leonard S. Rubinowitz, Exclusionary
Zoning: A Wrong in Search of a Remedy, 6 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 625, 629 (1973) (describing local
governments’ failure to act when implementing federal subsidy programs as a “local veto”); Herbert M.
Franklin, Federal Power and Subsidized Housing, 3 URB. LAW. 61, 63–64 (1971) (describing how every
metropolitan area, save Honolulu, has a low-income housing operation with a “local veto”).
133 Stacy E. Seicshnaydre, How Government Housing Perpetuates Racial Segregation: Lessons from
Post-Katrina New Orleans, 60 CATH. U. L. REV. 661, 688 (2011).
134 The implication is that state administrators would no longer necessarily defer to municipalities if
the municipality exercised a local veto over affordable housing projects seeking LIHTC financing. Rev.
Rul. 2016-29, 2016-52 I.R.B. 6; see Alan D. Viard, Low Income Housing Tax Credits and the
Concentration of Poverty, AEIDEAS (Jan. 10, 2017), https://www.aei.org/economics/low-incomehousing-tax-credits-and-the-concentration-of-poverty [https://perma.cc/W8DR-34NT] (“The [IRS]
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has largely been used in an intermunicipal context—cities exercising local
vetoes to block affordable housing within their boundaries.135 The term’s
relevance, however, is just as applicable in an intramunicipal context—local
legislators exercising sublocal vetoes through prerogative to block
affordable development within their districts.136
This Part discusses this relationship between prerogative and local
vetoes, describing the interaction at the microlocal level as a “legislator
veto.” The first Section describes the mechanics of how financing and land
use approval enable legislator vetoes. The second Section then traces a brief
history of antidevelopment sentiment and its connection to segregation,
which explains why a local legislator might exercise the veto in the first
place.
A. Affordable Housing and Hyperlocal Control
Federal housing policy today can be divided between promoting
homeownership and assisting low-income renters.137 Whereas the former
dominates in terms of federal expenditures,138 the latter serves a higher need
population—homeowners’ median income is roughly double the income of
renters.139 This Note focuses on the rental-assistance component of federal
housing policy.140 A massive shortage of affordable units exists today: only
ruling points out that a local opportunity to comment is not the same as a local veto.”). Because the IRS
ruling is not a mandate, some state agencies still defer to local vetoes in Low-Income Housing Tax Credit
(LIHTC) allocation. See, e.g., Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc. v. Dep’t of Treasury, 946 F.3d 649, 656–57
(5th Cir. 2019) (finding “it’s entirely speculative” that eliminating the local veto criteria would result in
LIHTC allocation to integrative projects).
135 See, e.g., Jacqueline Rabe Thomas, Separated by Design: Why Affordable Housing Is Built in
Areas with High Crime, Few Jobs and Struggling Schools, PROPUBLICA (Nov. 25, 2019, 5:00 AM),
https://www.propublica.org/article/separated-by-design-why-affordable-housing-is-built-in-areas-withhigh-crime-few-jobs-and-struggling-schools [https://perma.cc/5CXV-Z55V] (reporting how Connecticut
state agencies disproportionately award LIHTC funding to high-poverty areas); infra notes 287–291 and
accompanying text (describing the disparate allocation of low-income housing tax credits in the Baltimore
region).
136 See, e.g., Walz & Fron, supra note 28, at 15–17 (describing a Chicago alderman effectively killing
a fifty-five-unit affordable housing development in Portage Park by withdrawing his support).
137 See John D. Landis & Kirk McClure, Rethinking Federal Housing Policy, 76 J. AM. PLAN. ASS’N
319, 320 (2010).
138 Id. (estimating the federal government spent $6 assisting homeowners for every $1 assisting lowincome renters in 2008).
139 JOINT CTR. FOR HOUS. STUD. OF HARV. UNIV., AMERICA’S RENTAL HOUSING 2017, at 10 (2017),
https://www.jchs.harvard.edu/sites/default/files/harvard_jchs_americas_rental_housing_2017_0.pdf
[https://perma.cc/5KM5-WX5H] (contrasting the 2016 cash-renter median income of $37,300 to the
homeowner median income of $73,100).
140 This Note does not intend to pick a side in affordable housing’s longstanding preservation-versusmobility debate. Rather, this Note attempts to draw attention to prerogative and legislator vetoes insofar
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thirty-six affordable rental units are available for every one hundred
extremely low-income renter households.141 Furthermore, access to
affordable rental housing disproportionately impacts communities of color,
especially Black Americans, who account for 12% of all households, yet also
account for 26% of all low-income renters.142 To be sure, race and class are
not proxies.143 But “address[ing] the full range of discriminatory and
segregationist factors influencing people of color in American housing
markets” necessarily requires discussing income-based restrictions on
housing because of the overlap between race and poverty.144 Accordingly,
the location of affordable-housing development can shape the racial makeup
of the neighborhoods and cities in which this housing is sited.145
as they constrain the supply of affordable housing options that might otherwise be available for mobility
advocates. See generally SHEILA CROWLEY & DANILO PELLETIERE, AFFORDABLE HOUSING DILEMMA:
THE
PRESERVATION
VS.
MOBILITY
DEBATE
(2012),
https://nlihc.org/sites/default/files/affordablehousingdilemmareportmay-2012.pdf
[https://perma.cc/V7YM-253A] (finding that “over time the pendulum in the debate . . . has swung back
and forth between poverty dispersal and place-based strategies that seek to help poor people in their
current neighborhoods”).
141 Where “extremely low-income” is defined as at or below the poverty guideline or 30% of the area
median income (whichever is higher). AURAND ET AL., supra note 24, at 1.
142 “[N]on-Hispanic white households account for 65% of all U.S. households (including
homeowners and renters), 50% of all renters, and 43% of all extremely low-income renters. Black
households account for 12% of all households, yet they account for 19% of all renters and 26% of all
extremely low-income renters. Hispanic households account for 12% of all U.S. households, 19% of all
renters, and 21% of extremely low-income renters.” Id. at 13; see also Matthew Desmond, Unaffordable
America: Poverty, Housing, and Eviction, 22 FAST FOCUS 1, 1 (2015) (arguing rental affordability
disproportionately impacts Black-American and Hispanic households); JOINT CTR. FOR HOUS. STUD. OF
HARV. UNIV., supra note 139, at 17 (finding the median household income of Hispanic renters
approximately 15% lower and Black renters 30% lower than white renters, holding age constant).
143 See generally Raj Chetty, Nathaniel Hendren, Maggie R. Jones & Sonya R. Porter, Race and
Economic Opportunity in the United States: An Intergenerational Perspective, 135 Q.J. ECON. 711 (2020)
(using intergenerational economic data to explain racial disparities in income). One group of scholars
responded to the Chetty et al. research with the following: “One of the most popular liberal post-racial
ideas is the idea that the fundamental problem is class and not race, and clearly this study explodes that
idea . . . .” Emily Badger, Claire Cain Miller, Adam Pearce & Kevin Quealy, Extensive Data Shows
Punishing Reach of Racism for Black Boys, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 19, 2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2018/03/19/upshot/race-class-white-and-black-men.html
[https://perma.cc/A3RU-QFAF] (providing data visualizations for the Chetty et al. research).
144 EDWARD G. GOETZ, THE ONE-WAY STREET OF INTEGRATION: FAIR HOUSING AND THE PURSUIT
OF RACIAL JUSTICE IN AMERICAN CITIES 19 (2018). See generally ROTHSTEIN, supra note 25, at 177–88
(analyzing race, economic status, and housing); PATRICK SHARKEY, STUCK IN PLACE: URBAN
NEIGHBORHOODS AND THE END OF PROGRESS TOWARD RACIAL EQUALITY (2013) (same).
145 See Myron Orfield, Land Use and Housing Policies to Reduce Concentrated Poverty and Racial
Segregation, 33 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 877, 878 (2006) (“[S]tructural racism that restricts affordable
housing to ghettoized areas of the urban core intensifies racial segregation and perpetuates poverty.”);
DOUGLAS S. MASSEY, LEN ALBRIGHT, REBECCA CASCIANO, ELIZABETH DERICKSON & DAVID N.
KINSEY, CLIMBING MOUNT LAUREL: THE STRUGGLE FOR AFFORDABLE HOUSING AND SOCIAL MOBILITY
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Originally, the federal government attempted to address the lack of
affordable rental units with public housing projects,146 but such projects have
declined over recent decades.147 Instead, federal housing policy now
primarily consists of subsidizing private sector development,148 either
through vouchers or tax credits.149 An affordable housing development has
two key elements that require signoff from local government actors:
financing and land use approval. Financing subsidies include low-income
housing tax credits, tax-increment financing, and other special municipal
funding opportunities.150 Land use approval includes zoning changes,
permitting requirements, historical district compliance, environmental
impact review, and more.151
AMERICAN SUBURB 6, 21 (2013) (arguing housing-mobility programs, including subsidized
affordable housing and rental vouchers, “constitute an efficacious way” to decrease racial and class
segregation); MARGERY AUSTIN TURNER & LYNETTE RAWLINGS, URB. INST., PROMOTING
NEIGHBORHOOD
DIVERSITY:
BENEFITS,
BARRIERS,
AND
STRATEGIES
11
(2009),
https://www.urban.org/sites/default/files/publication/30631/411955-Promoting-NeighborhoodDiversity-Benefits-Barriers-and-Strategies.PDF [https://perma.cc/5DUQ-3X3C] (arguing for expanding
affordable housing options in affluent white jurisdictions to challenge “the persistence of racial and ethnic
exclusion”).
146 Affordable housing is definitionally distinct from public housing, although they are often
conflated. U.S. Department for Housing and Urban Development (HUD) defines the former as any
housing that costs less than 30% of post-tax income, whereas the latter is a federal program that contracts
with quasi-governmental public housing authorities at the local level. MAGGIE MCCARTY, CONG. RSCH.
SERV.,
R41654,
INTRODUCTION
TO
PUBLIC
HOUSING
1,
19
(2014),
https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R41654.pdf [https://perma.cc/SS3W-TWUT].
147
See Landis & McClure, supra note 137, at 321–23 (overviewing the history of federal housing
policy); Matthew Yglesias, Everything You Need to Know About the Affordable Housing Debate, VOX
(May 11, 2015, 11:43 AM), https://www.vox.com/2014/4/10/18076868/affordable-housing-explained
[https://perma.cc/RZ5G-CGEY] (“Over the past two decades, housing policy trends have been toward
reducing the amount of public housing.”). For a comprehensive history, see generally Charles J. Orlebeke,
The Evolution of Low‐Income Housing Policy, 1949 to 1999, 11 HOUS. POL’Y DEBATE 489 (2000).
148 Cf. KEEANGA-YAMAHTTA TAYLOR, RACE FOR PROFIT: HOW BANKS AND THE REAL ESTATE
INDUSTRY UNDERMINED BLACK HOMEOWNERSHIP 255 (2019) (arguing the political untenability of
public housing preceded the state growing “dependent on private sector forces to produce, manage, and
own the nation’s housing stock”).
149 See Landis & McClure, supra note 137, at 331–34 (contrasting public housing, vouchers, and tax
credits—the latter two subsidizing private housing).
150 See generally Joe Cortright, A Solution for Displacement: TIF for Affordable Housing, CITY
COMMENT. (Nov. 6, 2019), http://cityobservatory.org/a-solution-for-displacement-tif-for-affordablehousing/ [https://perma.cc/RRM8-755G] (overviewing financing options); Kathleen Kane-Willis,
Closing the Gap: Financing Affordable Housing in the Chicago Area, in AFFORDABLE HOUSING IN THE
CHICAGO REGION: PERSPECTIVES AND STRATEGIES 58, 69–73 (Phil Nyden, James Lewis, Kale Williams
& Nathan Benefield eds., 2003) (describing the mechanics of “closing the financing gap” for affordable
housing developers).
151 See generally PACE LAND USE L. CTR., BEGINNER’S GUIDE TO LAND USE LAW,
https://law.pace.edu/sites/default/files/LULC/LandUsePrimer.pdf
[https://perma.cc/9GUQ-RGJW]
(overviewing land use law).
IN AN

572

115:549 (2020)

Prerogative and Legislator Vetoes

Every city approaches these approvals differently, often depending on
the size of the municipality; some place decision-making in the hands of
unelected administrators, while others require full legislative council
signoff.152 In either case, support from the local legislator remains integral,
inevitably necessitating political support subject to local pressures.153 These
conditions give rise to legislator vetoes.
For example, if city administrators who handle financing defer to a local
legislator’s disapproval, the project will fail no matter how beneficial it may
be or how much the local community may desire it. Similarly, if land use
approval hinges on a majority vote in the city council but the council always
defers to the legislator’s prerogative, the project is doomed from the outset
without her support. Prerogative exacerbates the necessity of local political
support by effectively giving a veto to the legislator of the district in which
the affordable housing will be built.
B. Historical Antidevelopment Sentiment
Prerogative equips a local legislator with a tool to veto development,
but this does not explain when and why she uses it. Constituency pressures
provide the explanation. Antidevelopment sentiment today, unfortunately,
builds upon an American history of segregation that has fundamentally
intertwined race and housing. Modern housing patterns embody this
connection.154 Although some jurists blame the market for segregation
today,155 scholars have exposed the government’s comprehensive role in both
shaping and perpetuating these housing patterns in far greater detail than this
Note can.156 Accordingly, the following two examples—racially restrictive
covenants and public housing—merely illustrate the underlying systemic
racism that motivates antidevelopment sentiment today.

152

See Zimmermann, supra note 33 (overviewing local government structures).
See Katherine Levine Einstein, Maxwell Palmer & David M. Glick, Who Participates in Local
Government? Evidence from Meeting Minutes, 17 PERSPS. ON POL. 28, 37–39 (2019) (describing the
oppositional pressure from older, home-owning citizens exerted on lawmakers).
154 See Lutton et al., supra note 24 (mapping the lack of private mortgage lending to Black and Latino
neighborhoods in Chicago); Williams & Emamdjomeh, supra note 22; LOGAN & STULTS, supra note 22.
155 Compare Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 750 (2007)
(finding racial disparities resulted from de facto segregation “including voluntary housing choices”), with
id. at 806 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (finding the distinction between de jure and de facto segregation
“meaningless”).
156 As previously mentioned, for an excellent historical account, see ROTHSTEIN, supra note 25. For
a more quantitatively driven account, see JESSICA TROUNSTINE, SEGREGATION BY DESIGN: LOCAL
POLITICS AND INEQUALITY IN AMERICAN CITIES (2018).
153
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Racially restrictive covenants historically epitomized local hostility to
integration.157 Primarily used throughout the first half of the twentieth
century, these covenants precluded the future sale of properties to AfricanAmerican homebuyers and ran with the land.158 Courts across the country
justified their constitutionality by deeming the covenants private
agreements.159 In 1948, the Supreme Court forbade these covenants in
Shelley v. Kramer.160 Nevertheless, their impact persisted. The Federal
Housing Administration (FHA) continued financing subdivision
developments that openly excluded African-American homebuyers until
1962.161 Following Shelley, the FHA also continued insuring properties with
covenants that required neighbor or community approval before authorizing
a sale, functionally skirting Shelley’s proscription.162 Although the courts
eventually curtailed these evasive post-Shelley tactics,163 these deeds still
implicitly signaled that those formerly restricted would be shunned as
outsiders.164
Public housing policies have similarly evinced and instituted strong
anti-integrationist impulses. As originally conceived and funded by the
federal government during the New Deal, public housing addressed middleclass housing shortages based on income rather than race.165 Federal officials,
however, condoned segregated public housing in the 1949 Housing Act,

157 For a comprehensive overview of racial covenants and their legacy today, see RICHARD R. W.
BROOKS & CAROL M. ROSE, SAVING THE NEIGHBORHOOD: RACIALLY RESTRICTIVE COVENANTS, LAW,
AND SOCIAL NORMS (2013).
158 See id. at 3–4.
159 See, e.g., id. at 81 (discussing the Maryland Supreme Court’s 1938 decision in Meade v.
Dennistone, 196 A. 330 (Md. 1938), which upheld racially restrictive covenants as neighborhood
agreements).
160 334 U.S. 1 (1948). The Shelley decision was decided by only six Justices—three Justices recused
themselves because their own properties contained such covenants. Id. at 23.
161 ROTHSTEIN, supra note 25, at 88.
162 Id.
163 Id. at 90–91.
164 See BROOKS & ROSE, supra note 157, at 4, 177–82. Scholars argue new signaling devices have
taken their place, also enforced by the courts, which continue to indicate hostility to nonwhite
homebuyers. See, e.g., Deborah N. Archer, The New Housing Segregation: The Jim Crow Effects of
Crime-Free Housing Ordinances, 118 MICH. L. REV. 173 (2019) (arguing crime-free housing ordinances
enable racial discrimination); Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, Exclusionary Amenities in Residential
Communities, 92 VA. L. REV. 437 (2006) (arguing that “embedding costly, demographically polarizing
amenities,” such as golf memberships, into covenants signals homebuyers’ racial preferences and
excludes undesired races).
165 ROTHSTEIN, supra note 25, at 17. For a brief overview of the history of public housing, see
MCCARTY, supra note 146, at 1–9.
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thereby setting in motion a vicious cycle of racial isolation.166 Using federal
funding from the Housing Act, city housing authorities selected public
housing sites that maintained segregation.167 As the housing shortage
following World War II eased, the real estate lobby successfully advocated
for a strict income limit for public housing eligibility, forcing out middleclass families.168 Conditions deteriorated as the lack of “middle-class rents
resulted in inadequate maintenance budgets,” transforming “public housing
into a warehousing system for the poor.”169 By the 1970s, the Nixon
Administration decried these conditions and announced that public housing
should not be forced on white communities.170
The results of these and other policies are stark. Whereas in 1890, the
average city-dwelling African American lived in a neighborhood that was
27% Black, by 1990, that number had shot up to 56%.171 Racially segregated
housing patterns that historically existed on a block-by-block basis now
manifest across neighborhoods and even entire cities.172 Segregation has
become an ingrained characteristic of the American city.173
The traditional hostility to integration that previously generated racially
restrictive covenants and federal public housing policies now animates

166

See ROTHSTEIN, supra note 25, at 30–34. Even after Brown v. Board of Education in 1954,
“President Eisenhower’s housing administrator told a congressional committee that the government
should not ‘move too precipitously’ to eliminate racial segregation from federal programs.” Id. at 33.
167 Id. at 34–35. For one of the most famous examples of segregated public housing, see Gautreaux
v. Chicago Housing Authority, 296 F. Supp. 907 (N.D. Ill. 1969).
168 ROTHSTEIN, supra note 25, at 36.
169 Id. at 37; see also TAYLOR, supra note 148, at 254–55 (arguing the combination of physical
decline and decreasing income limits transformed public housing into “housing of last resort”).
170 ROTHSTEIN, supra note 25, at 37. In a report to Congress, President Richard Nixon described
public housing projects as “monstrous, depressing places—run down, overcrowded, crime-ridden, falling
apart.” President Richard Nixon, Special Message to the Congress Proposing Legislation and Outlining
Administration Actions to Deal with Federal Housing Policy (Sept. 19, 1973),
https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/special-message-the-congress-proposing-legislation-andoutlining-administration-actions [https://perma.cc/8ZAC-FQJV].
171 David M. Cutler, Edward L. Glaeser & Jacob L. Vigdor, The Rise and Decline of the American
Ghetto, 107 J. POL. ECON. 455, 456 (1999); see also id. at 497–99 (using wards as proxies for
neighborhoods from 1890 to 1940 and census tracts as proxies for neighborhoods post-1940).
172 TROUNSTINE, supra note 156, at 3.
173 Segregation’s impact today reaches beyond just housing, shaping, for example, the racial
disparities in police fatally shooting unarmed victims. See Mesic et al., supra note 22, at 113 (finding
“racial residential segregation was the most robust indicator associated with state-level racial disparities
in police shootings of unarmed victims” where a ten-point increase in the state racial segregation index
correlated with a 67% increase in the state’s ratio of police shootings of unarmed Black victims to police
shootings of unarmed white victims).

575

NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

neighborhood opposition to affordable housing.174 While these opponents
tend to use coded language like “neighborhood character” and “property
value preservation,” such concerns often mask an underlying discriminatory
purpose, whether conscious or not.175 Even the current President has
employed this racially implicit rhetoric, attacking affordable housing
because it “bring[s] who knows into your suburbs, so your communities will
be unsafe and your housing values will go down.”176 Further compounding
this hostility, the loudest participants at local government meetings tend to
be those who overwhelmingly oppose new development, thereby placing
further pressure on local legislators to oppose such projects.177 Although

174
See, e.g., Walz & Fron, supra note 28, at 13–15 (describing opposition to a development that
would trigger affordable housing requirements in Chicago’s Edison Park neighborhood); see also
TAYLOR, supra note 148, at 259–60 (“The conflation of race and risk to property value has been fully
absorbed into the popular culture and real estate acumen of the United States.”); Patrick Sharkey, To
Avoid Integration, Americans Built Barricades in Urban Space, ATLANTIC (June 20, 2020),
https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2020/06/barricades-let-urban-inequality-fester/613312/
[https://perma.cc/Z2VK-9H23] (connecting the history of racially restrictive covenants to urban housing
policy today).
175 See BRIAN J. MCCABE, NO PLACE LIKE HOME: WEALTH, COMMUNITY & THE POLITICS OF
HOMEOWNERSHIP 100 (2016); Paavo Monkkonen & Will Livesley-O’Neill, Overcoming Opposition to
New
Housing,
UCLA
LEWIS
CTR.
FOR
REG’L
POL’Y
STUD.
(2017),
https://www.lewis.ucla.edu/opposition-to-new-housing/ [https://perma.cc/33MF-2659] (identifying
motivations and methods for opposition to new housing); Chrishelle Palay, Opinion, It’s Time to Retire
This Scapegoat for Segregation, NEXT CITY (May 31, 2017), https://nextcity.org/daily/entry/houstonaffodable-housing-scapegoat-segregation-nimby [https://perma.cc/6B5J-3KFV] (describing the coded
language in discriminatory, NIMBY (Not In My Backyard) responses to affordable housing). For
examples of responses to such coded language, see Josh Lapp, Opinion, Preservation Efforts Should Be
Used for Progress, Not NIMBYism, COLUMBUS UNDERGROUND (Oct. 8, 2019, 12:30 PM),
https://www.columbusunderground.com/opinion-preservation-for-progress-not-nimbyism-jl1
[https://perma.cc/T6UX-DCH7]; Marian Mumford, Letter to the Editor, Objections Have Coded
Language, ITHACA J. (July 16, 2015, 2:10 PM), https://www.ithacajournal.com/story/opinion/readers/
2015/07/16/letter-project-objections-coded-language/30246187/ [https://perma.cc/LJ4V-54HW].
176 Danielle Kurtzleben, Seeking Suburban Votes, Trump to Repeal Rule Combating Racial Bias in
Housing, NPR (July 21, 2020, 1:38 PM), https://www.npr.org/2020/07/21/893471887/seeking-suburbanvotes-trump-targets-rule-to-combat-racial-bias-in-housing [https://perma.cc/LMQ8-TPBV]; see also
Remarks by President Trump in Press Conference, THE WHITE HOUSE (July 14, 2020, 5:29 PM),
https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/remarks-president-trump-press-conference-071420/
[https://perma.cc/QYM8-V4UE] (“I’ve been watching this for years in Westchester, coming from New
York. They want low-income housing built in a neighborhood. Well, I’m ending that rule. . . . Mothers
aren’t happy about that. Fathers aren’t happy about that. They worked hard to buy a house, and now
they’re going to watch the housing values drop like a rock, and that has happened.”).
177 Einstein et al., supra note 153, at 29–30; see also Asad R. Khan, Decentralized Land-Use
Regulation with Agglomeration Spillovers: Evidence from Aldermanic Privilege in Chicago 1–2 (Dec.
2019) (Job Market Paper, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign), https://drive.google.com/
file/d/1d3E7kTF_1U71FRImdfUQ-YwjEOd9bLhV/view [https://perma.cc/7YTS-YJDV] (finding
“strong political effects on zoning” and that “homeownership significantly predicts fewer and smaller
zoning changes” in Chicago).
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individuals express commitment to the ideal of integration in the abstract,
they consistently resist integration in their own neighborhoods, especially in
higher-income communities.178 Thus, in a prerogative regime today, if either
the legislator or her constituency wants to block an affordable-housing
proposal, the development will not proceed.
III. LEGISLATIVE SOLUTIONS
Prerogative exists in cities across the entire country, its prevalence
much wider than commonly realized. And though prerogative is not
inherently problematic—indeed, some proponents have defended the
practice as increasing legislator accountability to constituents179—the
segregative costs driven by legislator vetoes of affordable housing bear
addressing. Recognizing the need for reform, both academics and
community advocates have offered various legislative proposals to curb
prerogative. These proposals fit under two broad categories: electoral reform
and land use reform. Electoral reforms propose changing the structure of
local government such that prerogative’s influence diminishes. Land use
reforms more narrowly target the specific procedures prerogative controls.
The following Sections overview these two categories before ultimately
discussing the challenges of both and the ensuing need for judicial
intervention.
A. Electoral Reform
Some commenters propose reforms that target the very governmental
structures that enable prerogative. These structural reforms rely on a theory
that altering a legislator’s constituency will diminish prerogative’s
178

See, e.g., Jacqueline Rabe Thomas, Separated by Design: How Some of America’s Richest Towns
Fight Affordable Housing, PROPUBLICA (May 22, 2019, 5:00 AM), https://www.propublica.org/article/
how-some-of-americas-richest-towns-fight-affordable-housing
[https://perma.cc/W3GY-BXWM]
(describing how residents in high-income communities bemoan the potential development of affordable
housing and use coded language). This resistance is not a new phenomenon either. For example,
resistance to socioeconomic integration motivated the Austin neighborhood’s forced annexation to
Chicago in 1899 after Austin residents voted to expand the “L” public transit “to the chagrin of Oak Park
residents, who feared the arrival of inexpensive transportation would encourage working-class migration”
into the neighboring communities. Michael Romain, Austin’s Strange Plight, AUSTIN WKLY. NEWS (Oct.
22, 2019, 4:12 PM), https://www.austinweeklynews.com/News/Articles/10-22-2019/Austin's-strangeplight-/ [https://perma.cc/CSW6-JBQC].
179 See, e.g., Misra, supra note 5 (Alderman Carlos Ramirez-Rosa of Chicago’s 35th Ward arguing
that aldermanic prerogative provides local accountability); Ruthhart, supra note 5 (2019 Chicago mayoral
candidate Toni Preckwinkle arguing for prerogative’s local accountability); Morell, supra note 12
(Alderman Tom Tunney of Chicago’s 44th Ward arguing for prerogative’s local accountability); PEW
CHARITABLE TRS., supra note 35, at 1 (Philadelphia City Council President Darrell L. Clarke arguing for
prerogative’s local accountability).
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salience.180 One argument specifically looks to constituency size as a proxy
for the breadth of pressures a legislator faces.181 If prerogative is a means of
encouraging government to submit to hyperlocal pressures, decreasing the
number of legislators would necessarily increase the number of constituents
each legislator represents, thus increasing the breadth of pressures they face
and “forcing council members to focus more on citywide interests.”182
Accordingly, numerous commentators, including Ed Bachrach and Austin
Berg, have proposed council contraction—reducing the number of
legislators on the local legislative body.183 For example, for every one of St.
Louis’s twenty-eight aldermen, there are roughly 10,500 residents,184 making
the city’s number of representatives per capita one of the highest in the
country.185 This fragmentation has led aldermen to focus on narrow decisionmaking at the expense of citywide interests.186 Legislators increasingly weigh
a policy’s impact on “smaller and smaller patches of turf.”187 Aldermanic

180 See BACHRACH & BERG, supra note 31, at 31 (arguing that replacing Chicago’s aldermanic ward
system with a smaller city council will allow the council to tackle “big-picture, citywide policies”); see
also METRIC GEOMETRY & GERRYMANDERING GRP., STUDY OF REFORM PROPOSALS FOR CHICAGO CITY
COUNCIL 1 (2019), https://mggg.org/Chicago.pdf [https://perma.cc/H6WP-TZ59] [hereinafter MGGG
STUDY] (explaining how prerogative combined with carefully crafted districts entrenches local
legislators, rendering them unaccountable).
181 See THE CIVIC FED’N, supra note 58, at 69 (“A large council tends to focus more on constituent
services and localized interests than on functioning as a legislative body that emphasizes policymaking
and oversight. Smaller bodies are more focused on traditional legislative functions.”).
182
BACHRACH & BERG, supra note 31, at 21. For a discussion of contraction in relation to charter
reform, see Ed Bachrach & Austin Berg, Opinion, Time to Reform Chicago Governance with a City
Charter, LAW360 (Jan. 25, 2019, 1:14 PM) [hereinafter Bachrach & Berg, Time to Reform],
https://www.law360.com/articles/1122004/time-to-reform-chicago-governance-with-a-city-charter
[https://perma.cc/63ZK-7YJL].
183 BACHRACH & BERG, supra note 31, at 21; see also MGGG STUDY, supra note 180, at 1. City
council contraction usually comes up in the fiscal context, but relatedly often hinges on issues of
accountability, as demonstrated by the current debate in Cleveland. See Robert Higgs, Cleveland’s City
Council Has More Members and Higher Pay than Most Comparable Cities, CLEVELAND PLAIN DEALER
(Sept. 19, 2019), https://www.cleveland.com/news/erry-2018/11/9288790e0f7622/clevelands-citycouncil-has-mo.html [https://perma.cc/E5YD-AWSP]. See generally Douglas Muzzio & Tim Tompkins,
On the Size of the City Council: Finding the Mean, 37 PROC. ACAD. POL. SCI. 83 (1989) (summarizing
the effects of different local legislature sizes on representation and values like accountability and
participation).
184 This is based on an estimated current population of 293,792. St. Louis, Missouri Population 2020,
WORLD
POPULATION
REV.,
http://worldpopulationreview.com/us-cities/st-louis-population/
[https://perma.cc/3JUS-8MZH].
185
Scott Ogilvie, Comment, Reduce the Size of the Board of Aldermen, ST. LOUIS BUS. J. (May 10,
2018, 6:00 AM), https://www.bizjournals.com/stlouis/news/2018/05/10/commentary-reduce-the-size-ofthe-board-of.html [https://perma.cc/3NQ9-E3WQ].
186 Id.
187 Harney, supra note 127.
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contraction may loosen prerogative’s hold by making each legislator
accountable to a larger number of constituents.
Another theory argues that single-member districts enable
prerogative.188 In single-member districts, a city council or administrative
agency can defer to an individual legislator since a lone representative
creates a singular point of accountability.189 Academics therefore suggest—
sometimes in conjunction with contraction—that cities adopt multimember
districts.190 Because prerogative only arises in single-member contexts,
switching to a multimember structure would promote shared accountability
since councils could no longer defer to a single legislator.191 Furthermore,
like contraction, such a change would “provide a jolt to the system” by
changing the constituents and potential coalitions of long-serving
incumbents.192 In short, such reform would ideally end the fiefdom-like
nature of prerogative.193
Though they might provide other normative benefits, none of these
electoral-reform proposals would necessarily eliminate prerogative’s deeprooted grip. Aldermanic contraction might incentivize legislators to advocate
for a broader geographical constituency, but it will not undermine
prerogative itself. Even if a city like St. Louis halved its number of aldermen
to fourteen, those legislators might still exercise prerogative, just on behalf
of a larger constituency.194 Similarly, multimember district representatives
could still wield their veto power collectively. Or legislative bodies could
188
See Michael Hankinson & Asya Magazinnik, Aggregating Voters and the Electoral Connection:
The Effect of District Representation on the Distributive Equity of the Housing Supply 2 (Working Paper,
2019), chriswarshaw.com/lpe_conference/draft_190820.pdf [https://perma.cc/57DU-H2AZ]; see also
James C. Clingermayer, Electoral Representation, Zoning Politics, and the Exclusion of Group Homes,
47 POL. RSCH. Q. 969, 979 (1994) (arguing that at-large representatives “may be more open to the
influence of interests that may or may not be in tune with the preferences of their voters”).
189 See Hankinson & Magazinnik, supra note 188, at 2.
190 See, e.g., MGGG STUDY, supra note 180, at 2.
191 Id. at 21; see also Hankinson & Magazinnik, supra note 188, at 28 (finding that shifting from atlarge to district elections makes it harder to permit multifamily housing, but creates housing that is more
affordable and less concentrated, in part because “local interests have greater influence at the expense of
collective, citywide outcomes”). But see Craig M. Burnett & Vladimir Kogan, Local Logrolling?
Assessing the Impact of Legislative Districting in Los Angeles, 50 URB. AFFS. REV. 648, 664 (2014)
(finding that while council members in single-member districts defer to their colleagues, their deference
is conditional and legislators will still consider citywide interests, especially on more contentious
matters).
192 MGGG STUDY, supra note 180, at 21.
193
Id. at 22.
194 Similarly, if the city council in a large city like Chicago was cut in half to twenty-five aldermen,
nothing would prevent a single alderman representing twice as many residents from exercising
prerogative. To this point, each New York City council member represents a constituency roughly three
times the size of a Chicago alderman. See supra note 44 and accompanying text.
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adopt a policy of rejecting proposals that fail to command support from all
representatives of a particular multimember district, thus enabling legislators
to still exercise an individual veto.
Modifying the multimember proposal to instead switch some districtspecific seats to at-large representation similarly does not specifically
address prerogative. Although at-large representation may provide an initial
systemic jolt and promote shared accountability, the presence of at-large
legislators would not necessarily remove veto power from district-specific
representatives. Philadelphia, for instance, has both at-large and districtbased council members, yet prerogative still thrives.195 Moreover, such
redistricting also fails to account for the historical structural exclusion of
racial minorities within at-large electoral systems, which in some
jurisdictions legally prompted the shift to single-member districts.196
Pragmatic concerns also caution against electoral reform. For one,
electoral reform sweeps far more broadly than land use reform. Both
aldermanic contraction and shifting to multimember districts involve major
rebalancing of electoral power directly impacting incumbents, which is one
reason why contraction rarely occurs: few legislators will vote to eliminate
their own seat.197 Alternatively, reforming the land use planning process is
narrower. Land use reform does not implicate incumbency, one of the
foremost concerns of legislators.198 More promising legislative reform likely
targets legislators’ decision-making processes at a more granular level.
B. Land Use Reform
Academics and community advocates have thus offered ideas for
legislative reforms that strike more surgically at the logrolling—i.e., the

195

See supra Section I.B.
See, e.g., Bolden v. City of Mobile, 542 F. Supp. 1050, 1077 (S.D. Ala. 1982) (holding that “one
of the principal motivating factors for the at-large election system for the Mobile City Commission was
the purpose (intent) to discriminate against blacks”); Melissa J. Marschall, Anirudh V.S. Ruhil & Paru R.
Shah, The New Racial Calculus: Electoral Institutions and Black Representation in Local Legislatures,
54 AM. J. POL. SCI. 107, 122 (2010) (finding that increasing city council size can increase Black
representation and finding a lower threshold of Black representation in single-member districts than in
multimember districts). But see MGGG STUDY, supra note 180, at 3 (warning of the potential for plurality
voting to lead to vote-splitting).
197
See Muzzio & Tompkins, supra note 183, at 88 (“Legislatures, when left to their own devices,
almost always expand rather than diminish in size.”).
198 See Rebekah Herrick, Michael K. Moore & John R. Hibbing, Unfastening the Electoral
Connection: The Behavior of U.S. Representatives when Reelection Is No Longer a Factor, 56 J. POL.
214, 225–26 (1994) (finding that legislator activity is motivated by a reelection agenda).
196
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mutual exchange of deference—inherent in prerogative.199 One can construe
prerogative as a prisoner’s dilemma of distributive politics: legislators defer
to other legislators out of fear that their own preferences will not be honored.
Accordingly, one reform proposal is for cities to engage in binding
centralized planning.200 Professors Roderick Hills, Jr. and David Schleicher
argue that binding planning would consist of one-time, citywide land use
determinations with onerous procedures for future alteration, thereby
“deter[ring] parcel-specific deals from causing the multi-neighborhood
bargain over land uses to unravel.”201 The appeal of central planning is that
it overcomes the prisoner’s dilemma: legislators would no longer face
multiple land use votes where failure to defer could jeopardize their own
prerogative.202 Furthermore, a centralized plan could account for the
historical inequities in development, encouraging legislators to act with
citywide interests in mind, even when specific constituencies oppose
affordable development.203
Professors Hills and Schleicher have also argued for the use of
transferrable development rights (TDRs), which allow property owners to
sell their unused development rights—such as building higher or at increased
density—to other property owners.204 Although not addressing prerogative
head on, these scholars argue that TDR programs can transform the
constituency pressures that motivate a local legislator to wield her
prerogative.205 First, TDRs can enlarge the constituency base that actively
supports housing growth by appealing to both developers and
preservationists alike—two constituencies normally at odds with each
other.206 TDRs provide political cover for both camps, since they can each
herald the benefits of new development at the recipient parcel while also
applauding the preservation of the sending parcel.207 Second, TDRs can
199 See Editorial Board, Mayor Lightfoot and the Machine, supra note 9 (describing prerogative as
“akin to Washington, D.C., logrolling but murkier”).
200 See Hills & Schleicher, Planning an Affordable City, supra note 29, at 108–15; CHI. AREA FAIR
HOUS. ALL., supra note 58, at 68–69; Walz & Fron, supra note 28, at 18–19.
201 Hills & Schleicher, Planning an Affordable City, supra note 29, at 110.
202 Id. at 112–14 (“[M]embers of a party-less legislature ‘distribute’ goods broadly across electoral
districts to minimize their risk of being excluded from the necessarily fluid and unpredictable winning
coalition.”).
203 CHI. AREA FAIR HOUS. ALL., supra note 58, at 69; see also Walz & Fron, supra note 28, at 18
(describing how a centralized city plan should work to rectify historical inequities).
204
Hills & Schleicher, Building Coalitions out of Thin Air, supra note 83, at 4.
205 See id. at 40–42.
206 Id. at 4, 42–43; see also CROWLEY & PELLETIERE, supra note 140 (overviewing the debate
between preservation and mobility among affordable housing advocates).
207 Hills & Schleicher, Building Coalitions out of Thin Air, supra note 83, at 43.
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diminish the political power of those who oppose development by
undermining the “entitlement to zoning restrictions” that these opponents
rely on when arguing for maintaining the status quo.208 In short, TDR
programs can—in a perfect world—“transcend the acrimony of growth
control politics,”209 thereby reducing the likelihood that a legislator would
exercise a veto through prerogative. Nonetheless, while TDRs potentially
expand the coalition supporting affordable housing development, the
underlying incentives for developers still remain—namely the bottom line.210
A third proposal targets prerogative’s grip on committee procedure.
One of the ways in which legislative bodies honor prerogative is through
inaction: when an ordinance is referred to committee, if the legislator
exercising her prerogative does not want the ordinance to move forward,
parliamentary procedure allows the committee to indefinitely table the
ordinance, effectively killing it.211 Thus, Chicago housing advocates,
including Patricia Fron, Marisa Novara, and Kate Walz, propose
transforming inaction into approval for affordable developments in districts
without sufficient affordable housing and further requiring vetoes to include
transparent explanations.212 Additionally, these advocates propose creating a
review process for committee decision-making to increase transparency.213

208

Id. at 44.
Id. at 4.
210 Id. at 30 (“Requiring developers to buy both TDRs and, say, build affordable housing may mean
that developments will not ‘pencil’ (that is, be profitable enough to build).”).
211 See Walz & Fron, supra note 28, at 13; see also, e.g., Maya Dukmasova, Lost Battle on Affordable
Housing Means War on Aldermanic Prerogative Will Continue, CHI. READER (June 26, 2018, 5:49 PM),
https://www.chicagoreader.com/Bleader/archives/2018/06/26/lost-battle-on-affordable-housing-meanswar-on-aldermanic-prerogative-will-continue [https://perma.cc/K7UZ-A737] (describing an affordable
development effectively blocked when “the zoning committee indefinitely tabled a vote”).
212 SHRIVER CTR. ON POVERTY L. & CHI. AREA FAIR HOUS. ALL., WORKING TOWARD A HEALED
CITY: HOW CHICAGO CAN BUILD EQUITABLE COMMUNITIES FROM THE GROUND UP 11 (2019),
https://www.povertylaw.org/wpcontent/uploads/2019/10/2019_09_24_Working_Toward_A_Healed_Ci
ty-1.pdf [https://perma.cc/N3KS-8474]. For a proposed ordinance illustrating this reform, see Chi., Ill.,
O2018-6119, Affordable Housing Equity Ordinance (July 25, 2018). For background on this proposal,
see Marisa Novara, When Local Control Goes Wrong, METRO. PLAN. COUNCIL (Apr. 3, 2018),
https://www.metroplanning.org/news/8552/When-Local-Control-Goes-Wrong [https://perma.cc/4MY4MZJG], for an explanation that the proposal would avoid “forcing developers to abandon their plans
without ever actually being told no.” See Charles Isaacs, Environmental Justice in Little Village: A Case
for Reforming Chicago’s Zoning Law, 15 NW. J.L. & SOC. POL’Y. 357, 400 (2020), for arguments that
Chicago agencies and legislators should publish the “rationale for decisions on rezoning applications.”
213 Chi., Ill., Affordable Housing Equity Ordinance, supra note 212 (mandating that any appeal
decision “must be accompanied by written findings of fact specifying the reasons for the decision”);
METRO. PLAN. COUNCIL, OUR EQUITABLE FUTURE: A ROADMAP FOR THE CHICAGO REGION 12 (2018),
https://www.metroplanning.org/uploads/cms/documents/cost-of-segregation-roadmap.pdf
[https://perma.cc/LSX7-HHMU] (recommending that “when a residential development with at least 10
209
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Transparency and accountability underlie these reforms—ideally, objectivity
would displace prerogative’s subjectivity.214
Lastly, Professor Nestor Davidson has shown how city charter revision
can be a mechanism for systemic change.215 Revising a city’s charter would
not necessarily change the city’s land use determinations with regard to any
particular parcel.216 Revised charters, however, could enshrine ideals such as
equitable housing and transparent governance, thereby providing a hook for
judicial review if legislative bodies fail to live up to these ideals.217 Like
centralized planning, city charters necessarily focus on citywide issues rather
than hyperlocal issues. Charter revision therefore avoids the prisoner’s
dilemma of prerogative.218 But unless city legislators specifically revise their
charters to prohibit prerogative—a potentially impossible task when
prerogative exists as an unwritten tradition given its quid-pro-quo nature—
prerogative’s more pernicious tendencies may continue.
One difficulty with reforming land use processes is that these changes
may not sufficiently account for dynamic reactions.219 Across all proposals—
centralized planning, TDR zones, committee accountability, and charter
revision—market and political actors can shift their responsive timeframe to
an earlier point in the decision-making process.220 For example, rather than
exercising prerogative at the time of a zoning decision, legislators may
instead exercise prerogative at the adoption of the plan.221 Furthermore,
percent affordability is proposed in a ward with less than 10 percent affordable housing, the proposed
development can no longer be rejected or delayed indefinitely by the Alderman alone”).
214 Walz & Fron, supra note 28, at 20.
215 Nestor M. Davidson, Local Constitutions, 99 TEX. L. REV. (forthcoming 2020) (manuscript at
20–23) (on file with journal) (describing how some charters address governance processes and individual
rights like housing opportunity). Such a proposal requires a city charter, which would exclude Chicago.
Of the fifteen most populous cities, only Chicago and Indianapolis do not have charters. For a discussion
of charter creation and governance reform, see Bachrach & Berg, Time to Reform, supra note 182.
216 Davidson, supra note 215, at 48 (arguing that communities should only address “charter-worthy”
issues in their charters, like “[c]ore questions of structure and political process”).
217 Id. at 38, 42 (arguing charters can enshrine provisions that “reflect a community’s deepest values”
that courts can subsequently afford “greater deference”).
218 Id. at 38.
219 Just as omnibus appropriations legislation that consolidates most government spending into a
one-time vote faces interest group lobbying, so too would centralized land use decision-making. See
Schleicher, City Unplanning, supra note 33, at 1717.
220 See John Mangin, The New Exclusionary Zoning, 25 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 91, 100–02 (2014)
(describing the “multiple pressure points for anti-development activists to block developments”). For
example, in Baltimore County, the council banned campaign contributions during the one-year period
when the county’s zoning map is adopted in an effort to diminish the “pay to play” culture enabled by
prerogative; however, “a would-be developer seeking to gain favor with a council member simply has to
make a campaign contribution before the formal process begins.” Plymyer, supra note 93.
221 Id.
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especially for centralized planning, changes to procedure almost always
create processes for variances that can be exploited—rules beget exceptions.
Committee accountability similarly does not guarantee a solution, as
legislators can always explain votes with pretextual reasoning. But above all,
like electoral reform, political inertia animates the most pressing concern.
Even targeted land use reform faces the uphill battle of stripping legislators
of historically wielded power that purportedly fosters accountability.
IV. JUDICIAL SOLUTIONS
Electoral and land use reforms could indeed improve upon the status
quo, but their passage faces strong political headwinds. A legislative body
will hesitate to voluntarily curb its own power, especially when the body can
always invoke local expertise and accountability as justifications for the
power.222 Judicial intervention as an alternative solution, particularly in the
wake of legislative inaction, therefore merits serious consideration. Basic
principles of majoritarian government normally dictate against judicial
intervention. Our system of government commands that decisions be made
according to the democratic process.223 Still, it has long been recognized that
courts must intervene to ensure the soundness of the democratic process
when that process grows distorted as a structural matter.224 Intervention to
curtail prerogative regimes satisfies this justification.
222 “Any proposal to change prerogative is sure to face stiff opposition within City Council, which
considers the practice as fundamental a duty as passing an annual budget . . . . It is not going away anytime
soon. The question is whether prerogative can be made a more open process so that the public can better
examine the way it is used and its impact on Philadelphia’s future.” PEW CHARITABLE TRS., supra note
35, at 23; see also Cate Plys, Council Whores, CHI. READER (July 17, 1997),
https://www.chicagoreader.com/chicago/council-whores/Content?oid=893889 [https://perma.cc/6XNR6KVL] (examining Chicago’s efforts at ethics reform in the ’90s).
223 In principle, the democratic process ought to self-correct since unfavored legislation elicits a
negative public response. David A. Strauss, Is Carolene Products Obsolete?, 2010 U. ILL. L. REV. 1251,
1256–57; see also JONATHAN SUMPTION, TRIALS OF THE STATE: LAW AND THE DECLINE OF POLITICS
41–42 (2019) (arguing the judicial resolution of policy disputes “undermine[s] the single biggest
advantage of the political process, which is to accommodate the divergent interests and opinions of
citizens”).
224 See United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938). Though secondary to
structural distortion, the case might also be made for justification under the Carolene Products discrete
and insular minority rationale. See JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF
JUDICIAL REVIEW 135–36 (1980); ADAM COHEN, SUPREME INEQUALITY: THE SUPREME COURT’S FIFTYYEAR BATTLE FOR A MORE UNJUST AMERICA 6–8 (2020) (overviewing the historical consideration of
socioeconomic status qualifying as a discrete and insular minority when poor people “were often
physically segregated, in urban ghettos or on the ‘wrong’ side of the tracks”). If one construes prerogative
as a civil rights issue—a minor inferential jump given prerogative’s segregative impact—then the idea of
judicial intervention seems even less remarkable, as advancing civil rights has long required judicial
intervention as a precursor to legislative action, even when the latter might be considered a more
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Prerogative threatens the democratic process in two ways. First,
legislators subvert the democratic participatory process when they wield
prerogative at the behest of an entrenched majority—where wealthier, whiter
districts consistently reject the development of affordable housing in their
midst.225 Second, addressing prerogative necessarily implicates reform of the
legislative process itself, which often does not proceed even when a majority
supports it.226 Thus, turning to the courts becomes appropriate, either as a
temporary solution or as an external catalyst for legislative action.227
Although judicial intervention holds promise, few suits have challenged
prerogative at all, and even fewer have targeted its segregative impact. This
dearth of case law poses challenges for litigators and activists seeking to
challenge prerogative. The following Sections explore this limited case law,
thereby laying the groundwork for future research and litigation efforts. The
first Section examines recent legal claims brought by individual developers
and businesses upset with a specific local decision guided by prerogative.
These cases highlight the difficulty of challenging prerogative when it exists
as an unwritten tradition. The second Section discusses burgeoning legal
efforts to challenge prerogative at a systemic level, particularly in relation to
its impact on affordable housing development. A lawsuit in Los Angeles
successfully prompted legislators to curb their own prerogative, though
prerogative there existed in codified form. Conversely, in Chicago, one legal

legitimate means of lasting change. See generally David S. Meyer & Steven A. Boutcher, Signals and
Spillover: Brown v. Board of Education and Other Social Movements, 5 PERSPS. ON POL. 81 (2007)
(juxtaposing the social movements of education integration and marriage equality in their respective uses
of litigation as a means of pressuring legislative change).
225 See Nadav Shoked, The New Local, 100 VA. L. REV. 1323, 1386 (2014) (describing an entrenched
majority where policies fail to “reflect[] the balanced aggregate preferences of residents, because the
preferences of some will always be kept outside the decision-making calculus”); see also Michael J.
Klarman, Majoritarian Judicial Review: The Entrenchment Problem, 85 GEO. L.J. 491, 498 (1997)
(arguing for judicial review in the case of “cross-temporal” majority entrenchment, where political
majorities seek to perpetuate their power beyond their time in the majority).
226 For example, the proposed Affordable Housing Equity Ordinance in Chicago failed to pass out
of committee despite having twenty-seven sponsors—a majority of the City Council. See Chi., Ill.,
Affordable Housing Equity Ordinance, supra note 212. See generally Ittai Bar-Siman-Tov, Mending the
Legislative Process – The Preliminaries, 3 THEORY & PRAC. LEG. 245 (2015) (summarizing challenges
to reforming legislative processes).
227 See Joanne Scott & Susan Sturm, Courts as Catalysts: Re-thinking the Judicial Role in New
Governance, 13 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 565, 570–75 (2007) (arguing judicial review of majoritarian decisionmaking processes can prompt nonjudicial action); Susan Sturm, Resolving the Remedial Dilemma:
Strategies of Judicial Intervention in Prisons, 138 U. PA. L. REV. 805, 846–48 (1990) (describing the
judiciary’s capacity to “unlock organizational stasis” in the prison context).
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challenge has failed, another administrative complaint remains ongoing, and
legislative action has thus far stalled.228
A. Individual Challenges
Most case law discussing prerogative consists of individuals
challenging singular land use decisions that resulted from prerogative
deference, rather than systemic challenges to prerogative regimes in their
entirety. Nonetheless, these individual legal challenges still remain few and
far between. One theme that emerges after analyzing these cases is the
difficulty of finding municipal liability through a § 1983 claim, as first
established by Monell v. Department of Social Services.229 Section 1983
exists to vindicate the violation of constitutional rights, but Monell and its
progeny have protected municipalities by creating a high bar for liability.230
Accordingly, not only must a plaintiff prove a land use decision violated their
constitutional rights, but to hold the municipality liable, she must also prove
the legislator wielded prerogative with final policymaking authority or acted
pursuant to an official city policy or custom.231 The typical unwritten nature
of prerogative makes these Monell claims particularly difficult to prove. The
following cases illustrate this tension and include claims based on equal
protection, substantive due process, procedural due process, and First
Amendment violations.
In 2009, Chicago’s Congress Hotel sued Second Ward Alderman Bob
Fioretti.232 The hotel alleged Fioretti had impermissibly refused to issue
permits to operate a sidewalk cafe in violation of the Fourteenth
Amendment’s guarantee of equal protection by wielding his aldermanic
prerogative.233 The court’s opinion grappled with whether Fioretti’s actions
228 See Chi., Ill., Affordable Housing Equity Ordinance, supra note 212; infra notes 277–303 and
accompanying text.
229 436 U.S. 658, 694–95 (1978). These claims against municipalities under § 1983 are often called
Monell claims.
230 See Karen M. Blum, Section 1983 Litigation: The Maze, the Mud, and the Madness, 23 WM. &
MARY BILL RTS. J. 913, 914–20 (2015) (overviewing local government liability in Monell claims).
231 Id. at 914–16. Justice Stephen Breyer has noted Monell liability “is neither readily understandable
nor easy to apply.” Bd. of the Cnty. Comm’rs v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 433 (1997) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
232 520 S. Mich. Ave. Assocs. v. Fioretti (520 S. Mich. Ave. II), No. 07 C 4245, 2009 WL 3151794,
at *1 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 28, 2009). One of the other earliest recognitions of prerogative by a court in Chicago
occurred in the bankruptcy context. See In re J.S. II, L.L.C., No. 07 B 3856, 2007 WL 4233090, at *4
(Bankr. N.D. Ill. Nov. 29, 2007) (detailing the existence of aldermanic privilege and its alleged
relationship to the real estate involved in the bankruptcy).
233 520 S. Mich. Ave. II, 2009 WL 3151794, at *1. The hotel also alleged a due process violation,
which was dismissed because of a lack of a property interest, as well as a National Labor Relations Act
(NLRA) violation because it believed Fioretti had improperly used his aldermanic authority to force the
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could be attached to the city as a matter of final policymaking authority.234
The court recognized that a strict textual reading of the city Code meant
aldermen did not have absolute permitting power.235 But given the immense
evidence of prerogative’s impact—historical examples of permitting
additions to committee meeting agendas conditional on aldermanic
support,236 expert testimony from a veteran land use attorney,237 and
testimony from Fioretti about the deference he received238—the court found
the city council had effectively delegated final policymaking authority to the
alderman.239 Nonetheless, the hotel lost on the equal protection claim because
it failed to prove that Fioretti had intentionally treated the hotel differently
than other businesses with sidewalk cafes.240
In Waterfront Renaissance Associates v. City of Philadelphia, a
development company challenged a building-height-restriction ordinance as
an unconstitutional violation of its substantive due process rights.241 Like
Chicago in the Congress Hotel case, Philadelphia argued that it could not be
held liable for the actions of a single council member because he was not
acting pursuant to a city policy or custom as required by Monell, but the court
disagreed.242 In denying the motion to dismiss, the court held the heightrestriction ordinance had passed because of councilmanic prerogative, a
finding that cited a Pennsylvania Supreme Court decision from three years
earlier that had grappled with whether “deliberate inaction” could result from

hotel to settle its union dispute. 520 S. Mich. Ave. Assocs. v. Fioretti (520 S. Mich. Ave. I), No. 07 C
4245, 2008 WL 4831730, at *1–3, *8 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 5, 2008).
234 520 S. Mich. Ave. II, 2009 WL 3151794, at *1–2.
235 Id. at *2 (finding aldermanic “power is ostensibly limited by the Municipal Code’s admonition
that aldermen ‘not unreasonably with[o]ld’ approval and its requirement that the City Council vote on all
permit ordinances” (quoting CHI., ILL., MUN. CODE § 10–28–805)).
236 Id. at *3–4.
237 Id. at *6–7.
238 Id. at *7.
239 Id. at *10. More recently, in a 2018 case concerning retaliatory downzoning, the Northern District
of Illinois entertained the notion that aldermanic privilege gave the defendant alderman de facto final
policymaking authority; however, the court dismissed the claim because the rest of the complaint
contradicted this notion of de facto authority. Strauss v. City of Chicago, 346 F. Supp. 3d 1193, 1209
(N.D. Ill. 2018).
240
520 S. Mich. Ave. I, 2009 WL 3151794, at *11. The plaintiff did, however, win on its NLRA
claim, receiving an injunction enjoining the city from interfering with the hotel’s labor negotiations. Id.
at *19.
241 701 F. Supp. 2d 633, 637–38 (E.D. Pa. 2010).
242 Id. at 641.

587

NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

prerogative.243 Thus, because prerogative represented official policy, the
Waterfront Renaissance Associates court held that the city could be liable
for the actions of council members acting pursuant to prerogative.244
In a rare case challenging prerogative outside of Chicago or
Philadelphia, a Tennessee developer sued Nashville, the region’s housing
agency, and relevant council members when the defendants refused to grant
a necessary zoning change.245 The plaintiff’s procedural due process claim
argued that the regional housing agency refused to grant necessary
permissions until it first received approval from the property’s local council
member.246 Furthermore, the plaintiff argued the agency withdrew the zoning
request without an opportunity for the plaintiff to be heard.247 In granting the
agency’s motion to dismiss, the court held the plaintiff had failed to establish
a property interest.248 The court pointed to the metropolitan council’s
“discretionary” power over the zoning process as laid out in the city Code,
meaning no property interest existed.249 The court, however, failed to
consider whether prerogative might undermine that “discretionary” power at
the council level, such that the zoning process could potentially entail a
cognizable property interest.
Developers have also relied on First Amendment retaliation claims to
challenge prerogative as applied to their land use requests.250 One of the most
243

Id. at 642 n.8 (citing HSP Gaming, LP v. City Council, 939 A.2d 273, 283 (Pa. 2007)); see also
Phila. Ent. & Dev. Partners L.P. v. City Council, 943 A.2d 955, 965 (Pa. 2008) (supporting the
councilmanic courtesy finding in HSP Gaming).
244 701 F. Supp. 2d at 642 n.8. Ultimately, the court dismissed the claims as moot after an amendment
removed the height restrictions. CMR D.N. Corp. v. City of Philadelphia, 703 F.3d 612, 617 (3d Cir.
2013).
245 Vision Real Est. Inv. Corp. v. Metro. Gov’t of Nashville & Davidson Cnty., No. 3:18-cv-00014,
2019 WL 4748386, at *3 (M.D. Tenn. Sept. 30, 2019).
246 Id. at *9.
247 Id.
248 Id. This failure, notably, was based on the city’s ability to exercise discretion in rescinding a
benefit through the rezoning process, rather than being based on the existence of the benefit itself. Cf.
Bayview-Lofberg’s, Inc. v. City of Milwaukee, 905 F.2d 142, 146 (7th Cir. 1990) (denying a procedural
due process claim based on a liquor-license denial associated with prerogative because there was no
conferred benefit).
249 Vision Real Est., 2019 WL 4748386, at *9.
250 These claims assert that “the government’s exercise of an ostensibly neutral power has been
undertaken in retaliation for the exercise of First Amendment rights.” 1 RODNEY A. SMOLLA & MELVILLE
B. NIMMER, SMOLLA & NIMMER ON FREEDOM OF SPEECH § 3:14 (1994). One of the earliest cases
challenging aldermanic prerogative in Chicago also consisted of a First Amendment retaliation challenge.
Norflo Holding Corp. v. City of Chicago, No. 00 C 6208, 2002 WL 453605 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 25, 2002).
The court’s decision in that case highlighted a difficulty in challenging prerogative: because the alderman
never actually exercised her prerogative, the practice’s mere existence as a threat was insufficient to
establish municipal liability. Id. at *6.
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recent cases illustrating this type of claim is Feibush v. Johnson.251 A
Philadelphia developer argued that a council member retaliated against him
by exercising prerogative to block the sale of two city-owned lots.252 The
developer claimed that the retaliation was political: both men were running
for the same council seat.253 Notably, the parties stipulated that councilmanic
prerogative is an official custom in Philadelphia.254 The court found that the
plaintiff had sufficiently proven the retaliation claim;255 however, the
decision hinged on whether prerogative itself was the source of the injury, a
finding necessary for liability to attach.256 The council member, Johnson,
argued that prerogative did not cause the injury because his retaliation
constituted a solely personal decision.257 The court rejected Johnson’s
argument, relying on evidence demonstrating the ironclad nature of
prerogative in Philadelphia.258 Although any council member could introduce
the requisite resolution for the sale of a city-owned lot, prerogative’s grip
was so strong that the executive director of the city’s development authority
testified that he “could not recall any instance in which a Councilmember
other than Johnson introduced a resolution to approve the sale of City-owned
land in Johnson’s district.”259 Thus, because prerogative ensured the
defendant’s colleagues’ deference, the retaliation that injured the plaintiff
was rooted in a government policy.260
B. Systemic Challenges
In recent cases in Los Angeles and Chicago, plaintiffs have levied
systemic claims against prerogative. While the Los Angeles suit successfully
induced legislators to curb their own prerogative, Chicago plaintiffs have had
less success, demonstrating the difficulty of challenging prerogative at a
systemic level when it exists as an unwritten tradition. In July 2018, a
coalition called the Alliance of Californians for Community Empowerment

251

203 F. Supp. 3d 489 (E.D. Pa. 2016). The defendant in this case is also the same council member
recently indicted by federal prosecutors at the beginning of 2020. See supra notes 79–82 and
accompanying text.
252 Feibush, 203 F. Supp. at 491.
253 Id.
254 Id. at 496. It is possible this stipulation was driven by the HSP Gaming decision. See supra note
243 and accompanying text.
255 Feibush, 203 F. Supp. at 496.
256 Id. at 496–97.
257 Id. at 497.
258 Id. at 498.
259 Id.
260 Id.
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(ACCE Action) filed a lawsuit in California’s Superior Court for the County
of Los Angeles challenging a codified version of prerogative in Los
Angeles.261 The complaint alleged that city council members exercised
prerogative in a segregative manner by withholding their support from the
award of city financing for affordable housing development in their
districts.262 The complaint grounded these allegations in seven specific
causes of action, most of which were based on noncompliance with state
law.263 But one claim stood out as potentially applicable beyond California:
impermissible delegation of police and municipal powers to individual
council members.264
Because the city agency administering public funding for affordable
developments required letters of acknowledgment signed by the council
member of the district in which the proposed development sits, the
administrative agency’s deference to hyperlocal control created the
conditions for a “pocket veto,” i.e., legislator veto.265 In short, prerogative
exercised through the letters of acknowledgment “provide[d] a mechanism
by which discriminatory sentiments [could] . . . influence, obstruct, and
prevent the siting of affordable and supportive housing in the City.”266 ACCE
Action sought to enjoin the practice.267 The coalition argued the city had
“maintain[ed] racial and economic residential segregation throughout Los
Angeles by permitting individual councilmembers to limit mobility of low
income individuals into the neighborhoods they represent.”268
The lawsuit built upon mounting pressure for the city to curb its council
members’ hyperlocal control.269 Just a few months prior to the case’s official
filing, the Los Angeles Times editorial board called for an end to the

261 Complaint at 2–4, All. of Californians for Cmty. Empowerment v. City of Los Angeles, No.
BS174427 (L.A. Super. Ct., July 26, 2018)
[hereinafter
ACCE
Action
Complaint], http://www.publiccounsel.org/tools/assets/files/1043.pdf [https://perma.cc/3VZR-RQWL].
262 The lawsuit cited both affordable housing as well as “supportive housing”—a Los Angeles city
initiative, Proposition HHH, approved by voters in 2016 to address the homelessness crisis. Id. at 2–3.
263 ACCE Action pled two counts of noncompliance with California nondiscrimination law, two
counts of noncompliance with California’s Housing Element Law, one count of impermissible police and
municipal powers delegation, one count of violating the state constitution’s equal protection guarantee,
and one count of violating the state’s Fair Employment and Housing Act. Id. at 38–45.
264 See id. at 42–43; see also infra notes 307–308 and accompanying text (discussing the viability of
future challenges to prerogative).
265 ACCE Action Complaint, supra note 261, at 3–4.
266
Id. at 24.
267 Id. at 45.
268 Id. at 4–5.
269 See generally SHAW, supra note 26, at 60–62 (describing public reaction to the letter-ofacknowledgement requirement).
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practice.270 The editorial recognized the benefits of local input from the city
council, noting that “a developer would be foolish not to consult with a
council member throughout the process.”271 But the editorial nonetheless
concluded the costs outweighed the benefits since prerogative enables
“unlimited discretion” by allowing a legislator “to scuttle a project up front
for whatever reasons the member chooses.”272 Just days after ACCE Action
filed the complaint, the editorial board wrote again, calling on city officials
to act “before a judge makes them.”273 The California state legislature added
to this pressure by passing legislation permitting certain affordable housing
projects to bypass local approval processes, such as Los Angeles’ letter-ofacknowledgement requirement.274 Because of this pressure, the Los Angeles
city council voted to formally end the letter-of-acknowledgment requirement
only six months after the lawsuit began.275 The city council’s vote therefore
achieved what ACCE Action’s lawsuit initially set out to do: curb
prerogative giving rise to a legislator veto.276
In United States ex rel. Hanna v. City of Chicago, a resident sued the
city using a whistleblower statute, alleging Chicago had violated the False
Claims Act (FCA) by wrongfully certifying compliance with federal civil
rights requirements when it had increased, rather than reduced, racial
segregation in the city.277 Under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and
the Fair Housing Act, the plaintiff alleged the city did not meet its federal
obligation to affirmatively further fair housing when it knowingly

270 Editorial Board, L.A. City Council Members Shouldn’t Have the Power to Veto Homeless Housing
Projects at a Whim, L.A. TIMES (Mar. 17, 2018, 4:05 AM), https://www.latimes.com/opinion/editorials/
la-ed-homeless-housing-hhh-letter-20180317-story.html [https://perma.cc/ZAB7-ZE9V].
271 Id.
272 Id.
273 Editorial Board, L.A. City Council Members Don’t Deserve Unilateral Veto Power over Homeless
Projects They Don’t Like, L.A. TIMES (Aug. 1, 2018, 4:10 AM), https://www.latimes.com/
opinion/editorials/la-ed-homeless-housing-letter-lawsuit-20180801-story.html [https://perma.cc/8EDBGE5Y].
274 See Assem. B. 2162, 2018 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2018); Katy Murphy, California Bill to Speed
Housing for the Homeless Signed into Law, MARIN INDEP. J. (Sept. 26, 2018, 5:43 PM),
https://www.marinij.com/2018/09/26/california-bill-to-fast-track-housing-for-the-homeless-signed-intolaw/ [https://perma.cc/S9F3-KHUZ].
275 L.A., Cal., Ordinance 18-0955 (Oct. 9, 2018) (motion); L.A., Cal., Ordinance 18-0955 (Oct. 17,
2018)
(council
file),
https://cityclerk.lacity.org/lacityclerkconnect/index.cfm?fa=vcfi.dsp_
CFMS_Report&rptid=99&cfnumber=18-0955 [https://perma.cc/PUW2-QCA8].
276
See Lawsuit Successfully Halts Illegal Pocket Veto Used to Block Supportive and Affordable
Housing Projects in Los Angeles, ROSEN BIEN GALVAN & GRUNFELD LLP (Jan. 22, 2019),
https://rbgg.com/lawsuit-successfully-halts-illegal-pocket-veto-used-to-block-supportive-andaffordable-housing-projects-in-los-angeles/ [https://perma.cc/4LAY-63JE].
277 834 F.3d 775, 776 (7th Cir. 2016).
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perpetuated existing patterns of racial segregation when siting affordable
housing.278 The plaintiff argued that prerogative gave aldermen “full
authority to determine whether and where affordable, multifamily rental
housing” would be built in their wards and noted that, from 2006 to 2011,
93% of the 2,600 approved affordable units were sited in low-income
areas.279
The Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision to grant the
city’s motion to dismiss for insufficient particularity in the pleadings.280
While the district court held that the plaintiff failed to prove intent on the
city’s part,281 in reviewing the decision de novo, the Seventh Circuit upheld
the decision on slightly different grounds, holding Hanna had not pleaded
specifics such as the time, place, and method of the city’s alleged fraud.282 In
a statement that might undermine the future use of FCA legal challenges to
prerogative, the Seventh Circuit also questioned whether citizens with only
publicly accessible information can bring such claims, since “the FCA is
meant to encourage whistleblowing by insiders.”283 Thus, despite the
plaintiff’s compelling data, the city prevailed.
More recently, in November 2018 a coalition of fair housing
organizations called the Chicago Area Fair Housing Alliance (CAFHA)
partnered together to challenge aldermanic prerogative insofar as it
perpetuates segregation through legislator vetoes.284 Rather than filing a
traditional lawsuit in court, the coalition instead has chosen to pursue an
administrative complaint through the U.S. Department for Housing and
Urban Development (HUD).285 This type of complaint allows HUD to
investigate the merits of a claim and share those findings while attempting
to mediate the dispute through voluntary compliance or a conciliation

278

Id. at 776–77.
Id. at 777–78.
280 Id. at 776. Because Hanna brought a claim under the FCA, his complaint did not fall under the
typical notice-pleading standard of Rule 8, but instead fell under the particularity standard of Rule 9(b).
Id. at 778–79.
281 United States ex rel. Hanna v. City of Chicago, No. 11-CV-04885, 2015 WL 5461664, at *3 (N.D.
Ill. Sept. 16, 2015), aff’d sub nom. 834 F.3d 775, 776 (7th Cir. 2016).
282 Hanna, 834 F.3d at 779–80.
283 Id. at 780.
284
HUD Administrative Complaint at 3, Chi. Area Fair Hous. All. v. City of Chicago (Nov. 15,
2018)
[hereinafter
CAFHA
Complaint],
https://www.povertylaw.org/wpcontent/uploads/2019/11/CAFHA-et.-al-v.-City-of-Chicago-HUD-Administrative-Complaint.pdf
[https://perma.cc/9WBM-QUAW].
285 Id. at 19.
279

592

115:549 (2020)

Prerogative and Legislator Vetoes

agreement.286 This strategy mirrored a successful HUD complaint in
Maryland, where a regional coalition of fair housing organizations alleged
that cities in the Baltimore metropolitan area used their local control over
Low-Income Housing Tax Credit (LIHTC) funding to block affordable
housing development, such that affordable housing was only built in
predominantly minority areas.287 The Baltimore coalition eventually reached
a conciliation agreement with Maryland, where the state agreed to equitably
site and finance 1,500 affordable housing units.288 This settlement, however,
only occurred after the Maryland state legislature amended its state law to
eliminate the local veto in LIHTC allocation,289 an amendment that
foreshadowed the IRS guidance previously discussed.290 Accordingly, the
HUD settlement also included a provision mandating the state never reinstate
the local-approval requirement.291
Drawing on the Maryland HUD action, the CAFHA complaint invokes
Chicago’s history of aldermen abusing their prerogative in the context of
siting public housing.292 Like Hanna, the complaint also relied on statistical
evidence demonstrating prerogative’s segregative influence. The complaint
stated that from 1992 to 2017, Chicago approved loans for 3,394 affordable
units, but 90% (3,052) of all those units were located in areas that were
already predominantly nonwhite.293 Moreover, just five of Chicago’s fifty
286

If a violation is found, in some cases HUD will also bring a subsequent legal action. LIBBY PERL,
CONG. RSCH. SERV., R44557, THE FAIR HOUSING ACT: HUD OVERSIGHT, PROGRAMS, AND ACTIVITIES
3–4 (2018), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R44557.pdf [https://perma.cc/2RE2-ASER].
287 HUD Administrative Complaint at 3, Balt. Reg’l Hous. Campaign v. Maryland (Aug. 30, 2011)
[hereinafter
BRHC
Complaint],
https://www.prrac.org/pdf/BRHC_Complaint_2011.pdf
[https://perma.cc/9VLH-CBPJ].
288 Letter from Melody Taylor, Dir., Region III, Off. of Fair Hous. & Equal Opportunity, to Kenneth
Holt, Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t for Hous. & Cmty. Dev. (Sept. 28, 2017) [hereinafter BRHC Settlement Letter],
https://assets.documentcloud.org/documents/6406181/Maryland-LIHTC-settlement-with-HUD.pdf
[https://perma.cc/3H2W-HLXE]. See generally Sarah Gantz, Maryland Reaches Fair Housing
Agreement
with
Federal
Government,
BALT.
SUN
(Oct.
3,
2017),
https://www.baltimoresun.com/business/bs-bz-fair-housing-maryland-20171003-story.html
[https://perma.cc/Z7LS-X495] (summarizing the settlement).
289 See Multifamily Rental Housing Programs Efficiency Act, H.B. 453, Reg. Sess., § 4–213(b) (Md.
2014),
https://legiscan.com/MD/text/HB453/id/1012387/Maryland-2014-HB453-Chaptered.pdf
[https://perma.cc/RJZ5-XYFU]; Lawrence Lanahan, A Significant Victory: State Settles Maryland
Housing Discrimination Complaint, Hundreds of Affordable Homes Promised, BALT. SUN (Oct. 11, 2017,
12:26 PM), https://www.baltimoresun.com/citypaper/bcp-101117-mob-housing-settlement-20171010story.html [https://perma.cc/6U5C-PG52] (discussing events surrounding the settlement).
290
See supra note 134 and accompanying text.
291 BRHC Settlement Letter, supra note 288, at 5.
292 See, e.g., Gautreaux v. Chi. Hous. Auth., 296 F. Supp. 907, 910 (N.D. Ill. 1969); CAFHA
Complaint, supra note 284, at 7–8.
293 CAFHA Complaint, supra note 284, at 12–13.
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wards accepted 59% of all units; conversely, twenty-seven wards did not
accept a single unit.294 Unsurprisingly, those latter wards are
disproportionately white and high-income.295 To further substantiate the data,
CAFHA submitted multiple FOIA requests to the city seeking evidence of
any affordable housing project that received funds without aldermanic
support, and the city could not provide any proof.296 Given the practice’s
segregative impact, CAFHA has alleged violations of the Fair Housing Act,
Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and § 109 of the Housing and
Community Development Act of 1974.297
Today, CAFHA’s complaint has yet to yield a settlement or any
municipal legislation, as HUD continues to investigate. Notwithstanding this
lack of action, in February 2020, state representatives in the Illinois General
Assembly introduced a bill called the “End Aldermanic Privilege Law,”298
similar to California’s legislation curtailing prerogative in Los Angeles.299
The bill would curb aldermanic privilege in zoning approvals by giving
developers a legal cause of action and imposing fines on Chicago.300 The
bill’s future, however, is murky at best.301 Months after its introduction, the
bill had yet to receive a cosponsor from the General Assembly’s Chicago

294

Id.
Id.
296 Id. at 12.
297 Id. at 19–20.
298 End Aldermanic Privilege Law, H.B. 4484, 101st Gen. Assemb. (Ill. 2020). On June 23, 2020 the
bill was re-referred to the Rules Committee where, as of October 1, 2020, it remains. Bill Status of
HB4484, ILL. GEN. ASSEMBLY, http://www.ilga.gov/legislation/BillStatus.asp?DocNum=4484&GAID=
15&DocTypeID=HB&LegId=124034&SessionID=108&GA=101 [https://perma.cc/J4KB-C8UC].
299 See Murphy, supra note 274 and accompanying text.
300 Bill Status of HB4484, supra note 298 (“[I]n the City of Chicago, a property owner, or a developer
or contractor having the written permission of the property owner, shall not have any approvals under the
Zoning Division denied because of an aldermanic hold, objection, extra-judicial or extra-legal request
. . . . Allows suit against the State or the City of Chicago that seeks to enforce or impose a more restrictive
law, regulation, ordinance, or resolution against the property owner, developer, or contractor and allows
for a $5,000 civil penalty and other damages if the property owner’s, developer’s, or contractor’s claim
is successful.”).
301 See Heather Cherone, Suburban Lawmaker Introduces Bill to End Aldermanic Prerogative in
Chicago, DAILY LINE (Feb. 5, 2020), https://thedailyline.net/chicago/02/05/2020/suburban-lawmakerintroduces-bill-to-end-aldermanic-prerogative-in-chicago [https://perma.cc/XF8H-BWJF] (describing
the difficult path the bill faces).
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delegation.302 The equitable development of affordable housing remains a
spark plug in Chicago politics, and prerogative persists.303
*

*

*

Because legislators have not shown themselves eager to curb their own
prerogative, judicial intervention merits consideration as an alternative
solution. But ultimately, judicial intervention often is most effective as a
temporary fix and external catalyst for legislative action.304 The challenge is
to craft a lawsuit that not only provides immediate relief to plaintiffs, but
also overcomes the legislature’s inertia and spurs the passage of the
promising legislative solutions discussed above. With this goal in mind,
which of the legal challenges just reviewed materializes as most promising?
Individual challenges might prove most useful in setting up systemic
challenges. A recurring issue of individual challenges is the difficulty of
holding municipalities liable through Monell claims. Especially when
prerogative exists as an unwritten tradition, cases in jurisdictions without
precedent recognizing prerogative as a legislative custom or de facto policy
can make this a complicated task. As to identifying the best legal theory, the
cases above suggest no silver bullet exists and that plaintiffs will have to
make particularized determinations.305 Furthermore, insofar as individual
302 Illinois
House Bill 4484, LEGISCAN, https://legiscan.com/IL/sponsors/HB4484/2019
[https://perma.cc/SQ95-ZVFD]. Mayor Lightfoot’s City Council floor leader, Alderman Gilbert Villegas,
has called the proposed legislation a “publicity stunt tailor-made to capitalize on the burgeoning
corruption scandal that has spread from City Hall and the south suburbs to Springfield.” Fran Spielman,
Lightfoot Gets Unlikely Assist with Potential End-Run Around City Council on Aldermanic Prerogative,
CHI.
SUN-TIMES
(Feb.
6,
2020,
4:36
PM),
https://chicago.suntimes.com/cityhall/2020/2/6/21127063/aldermanic-prerogative-chicago-city-council-zoning-wards-deanne-mazzochilightfoot [https://perma.cc/UN2C-4AX4].
303 See, e.g., As Lightfoot Touts Poverty Initiative, Ideas from People Actually Experiencing Poverty
Were Left Out, Groups Say, CHI. COAL. FOR HOMELESS (Feb. 26, 2020), https://www.
chicagohomeless.org/as-lightfoot-touts-poverty-initiative-ideas-from-people-actually-experiencingpoverty-were-left-out-groups-say [https://perma.cc/NCL7-PCXF]; Jay Koziarz, Will New Legislation Fix
Chicago’s Affordable Housing Crisis, or Stymie Development?, CURBED CHI. (Dec. 12, 2019, 3:14 PM),
https://chicago.curbed.com/2019/12/12/21011062/affordable-housing-development-for-all-ordinance
[https://perma.cc/PY8S-82NB]; Joe Cahill, A Better Remedy for Chicago’s Affordable Housing Shortage,
CRAIN’S CHI. BUS. (Jan. 21, 2020, 4:10 PM), https://www.chicagobusiness.com/joe-cahillbusiness/better-remedy-chicagos-affordable-housing-shortage [https://perma.cc/H9YD-A3HY].
304 Cf. Ramsin Canon, Chicago Journal on Aldermanic Privilege, GAPERS BLOCK (July 16, 2009),
http://gapersblock.com/mechanics/2009/07/16/chicago-journal-on-aldermanic [https://perma.cc/69VM678N] (discussing the uneasy balance required between judicial intervention and legislative action).
305 Asking, for example, whether there are similarly situated comparators for an equal protection
claim, a cognizable property interest for a due process claim, or retaliatory grounds for a First Amendment
claim.

595

NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

litigants challenge prerogative’s segregative impact, successful individual
challenges unfortunately can only impact one affordable development at a
time.
Conversely, systemic challenges have greater potential for sweeping
change. But this route can be just as, if not more, difficult. One of the major
issues with pursuing an administrative complaint is that these proceedings
are wholly controlled by the current presidential Administration, subject to
its policy priorities.306 The Los Angeles litigation offers an alternative—and
likely more promising—avenue in state court. ACCE Action based one of its
claims on state nondelegation doctrine,307 which could also be litigated in
other municipal contexts. Though the California state court never actually
decided the case, this nondelegation claim was the only count generalizable
beyond California since the nondelegation doctrine remains viable at the
state level.308 Accordingly, opponents of prerogative in other cities might
consider similarly grounding their claims in nondelegation principles.
CONCLUSION
Prerogative’s most pernicious evil is its capacity to perpetuate
segregation. But uprooting regimes of prerogative is an uphill battle,
especially when these regimes date back decades and exist as unwritten
traditions. City councils, of their own accord, are loath to curtail their own
power. Although one might hope that connecting prerogative to segregative
legislator vetoes would spur change, prerogative’s entrenched, national
reach suggests that the injustice of segregation is still likely insufficient for
internally motivated change. Legislators, concerned with their own
reelection, will hesitate to depart from the status quo. Accordingly, even
when a local legislative body agrees on the need for equitably located
affordable housing, majoritarian beliefs about structural power and
prerogative swallow the housing agenda. Fortunately, as a growing number
of cases suggest, counter-majoritarianism expressed through judicial

306 For example, the Trump Administration promulgated a rule reinterpreting the Fair Housing Act’s
disparate impact theory of liability, thereby making the law more hostile to plaintiffs. Kriston Capps, With
Rule Changes, Trump Launches ‘an Attack on Fair Housing From All Sides’, BLOOMBERG CITYLAB
(Sep. 10, 2020, 12:09 PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-09-09/how-hud-rewrotethe-rules-on-fair-housing [https://perma.cc/6TMQ-2QQ2]. While Baltimore’s administrative complaint
led to a successful outcome for fair housing advocates, that dispute was filed and decided during the
Obama Administration; CAFHA filed its complaint in 2018 and its outcome remains uncertain.
307 See ACCE Action Complaint, supra note 261, at 42–43.
308 See Edward H. Stiglitz, The Limits of Judicial Control and the Nondelegation Doctrine, 34 J.L.
ECON. & ORG. 27, 30–34 (2018) (noting that “even if the doctrine is essentially silent at the federal
level . . . it continues to thrive in many states”).
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intervention may provide an alternative avenue to spur legislative action that
meaningfully constrains prerogative.
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